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Abstract 
 
This thesis extends existing research in two separate areas of experimental 
economics and contains three distinct experimental studies.  The first two chapters 
are concerned with the bubbles that have long been observed in experimental asset 
markets and are inspired partially by real bubbles observed in the housing market.  
The first chapter reports an experiment designed to capture evidence of herding 
behaviour and the effects of regret on bubbles. The second chapter examines the 
impact of speculation on prices and considers how the nature of the fundamental 
value of the asset traded may be a possible cause of asset market bubbles. A single, 
lumpy asset is traded as a closer approximation to a house purchase than the multi-
unit type of asset usually traded in experimental markets and the fundamental value 
is designed to rise rather than fall to better capture the usual direction of housing 
market fundamentals.  In chapter one it is found that herding tendencies and fear of 
regret may have some impact upon bubbles and evidence of learning is also present.  
In chapter 2, the impacts of speculation and an increasing fundamental value do not 
provide the hypothesised outcomes, but bubbles are perhaps prevented by the quality 
of the information given to subjects. The third chapter contains an experimental 
exploration of the impact of regret and of illusion of control on decision making in 
an experimental setting using national lottery scratch cards to elicit the emotion of 
regret and the selection of coloured envelopes to provoke the illusion of control in 
subjects. It finds support for the notion that regret, particularly feedback conditional 
regret, impacts on decisions and specifically on the willingness to part with the card 
for a cash sum. 
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Introduction 
 
Asset market bubbles are a regularly occurring phenomenon in real markets and also 
have been persistently created in a laboratory setting. 
The first two chapters report results from two asset market experiments that 
aim to extend research in this already substantial area.  The inspiration for the 
experiments contained in chapters one and two is the phenomenon of asset market 
bubbles occurring in the housing market though the experimental precedents for the 
research were inspired by stock market bubbles.  The Assets 2 experiment considers 
the impact of herding behaviour and regret on asset markets and the Assets 3 
experiment considers the impact of speculation and also of the nature of the 
fundamental value of the asset being traded.  Both experiments vary the feedback 
given to participants in ways that can influence regret and the potential for herding 
behaviour. 
A deeper examination of the power of regret on decision making follows in 
chapter three.  Results are presented from an experiment where manipulation of the 
emotion of regret is shown to have an impact on behaviour in an experimental 
setting.  The experimental design separates the effects on behaviour of feedback 
conditional regret from those of illusion of control using national lottery scratch 
cards.  Previous studies have examined the influence of these factors separately, but 
in the experiment reported here the novelty lies in disentangling the effects that 
regret may exert on illusion of control.  A large literature from the fields of both 
psychology and economics are brought together in order to design a novel 
experiment that provides evidence of a significant impact of regret on decision 
making. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Assets 2 Experiment 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports an experimental attempt to investigate the role of 
feedback conditional regret and herding behaviour in the creation of asset market 
bubbles, with particular relevance to those found in the housing market.  It builds 
upon a large body of work in asset market experiments and, to a lesser extent, 
auction experiments.  In asset market experiments there is a robust finding of bidding 
for assets in excess of their fundamental value; this being the defining characteristic 
of a bubble.  In auction experiments, the phenomenon of the ‘winner’s curse’ has 
resulted in the price paid for an auctioned item being in excess of its true value. 
There is convincing evidence that the housing stock in the UK is overvalued 
and that during booms the departure of house prices from fundamental worth 
becomes greater still  (see for example Muellbauer and Murphy 1997 in the UK or 
Case and Shiller 2003 in the US), .  If we accept the evidence that housing stock is 
overvalued and at times possibly significantly so, it rather begs the question ‘Why 
are people willing to pay more for an asset than it is worth? 
There is a substantial body of research from behavioural finance looking at 
the phenomenon of bubbles in asset markets with investor psychology being a factor 
such as Statman and Meir (1995), Barberis et al (1998), Hirshleifer 2001.  Cognitive 
errors, regret aversion, framing effects and mental accounting are amongst many of 
the explanations for behaviour that goes against the predictions of standard theory 
and has been observed empirically and experimentally to affect prices.   Housing 
markets, in contrast to financial markets, are inhabited to a significant degree by 
amateur investors whom one can imagine would only be more prone to cognitive 
biases and emotional factors than professional investors when making investment 
decisions.  With fewer opportunities for learning than in most asset markets (as 
property is generally bought and sold less frequently than portfolio assets), it is 
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possible that the aforementioned behavioural anomalies could be more prevalent in 
housing markets.  It is at least safe to say that the housing market must be at least as 
prone to these as other asset markets so the experiment reported here models this 
market more closely than the financial markets mimicked in previous experimental 
work. 
The experiment reported in this chapter adjusts the design of a standard asset 
market experiment to make subjects consider investing irreversibly in a single 
‘lumpy’ asset and provides some evidence that a simple manipulation of emotions 
can impact upon bidding behaviour and market prices.  The usual design includes an 
experimental market for many units of an identical asset (representative of a number 
of shares for sale in a financial market) whereas in the experiment reported here, 
subjects may bid for a single asset representing all, or a significant proportion of, 
their potential earnings from the experiment so any potential regret is focussed on a 
single decision, rather than many. Any regret-aversion is measurable in the 
difference in bidding activity between treatments where feedback on the final value 
of the asset is given to all participants and those where it is not. Two potential 
influences on behaviour, feedback conditional regret and non-rational herding 
tendencies are tested for in the decision making task.   
Feedback conditional regret can be defined as the regret felt when one learns 
of the outcome of forgone choices and this may be significant in decision making in 
real asset markets as protection from experiencing regret is rare.  By varying the 
feedback on their decisions, subjects in an experimental setting can be used to 
identify if their choices are influenced by the potential to experience regret. 
Herding, as defined by some sort of collective irrationality, where decision 
makers somewhat blindly follow the actions of others without a rational justification 
for their actions could be at least partially responsible for bubbles.  By providing 
feedback on the decisions of others, one can observe if the willingness to buy an 
asset and the price one is willing to pay is influenced by others facing the same 
decision task.   
The experiment finds that both herding and FCR alter the mean bids made for 
an experimental asset and its market price. 
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2. Fundamental value 
 
Stock market bubbles have attracted a substantial amount of both academic 
and media attention, though interest has also increasingly been focused on the 
housing market and fluctuations in house prices.  The UK housing market, in 
common with many around the world, has experienced several decades of volatility. 
If periods of rapid price rises followed by collapses in prices are indicative of 
bubbles in the housing market, this at least implies some cyclical detachment of 
house prices from fundamental value.  Further, there is a widely held view that there 
is an endemic overvaluation of housing stock in the UK.  An IMF model estimated 
the overvaluation to be something of the order of 30% at the start of 2004
1
.  If prices 
are on a long term upward trend, what evidence is there that this is caused by 
anything other than changes in the fundamentals that determine prices?  Meen (1996) 
found the following variables to be significant in determining house prices in the 
long run: incomes, real interest rates, housing stock, demographic changes, credit 
availability and tax structure.  However, he found that they only explained a 
proportion of the price increases during booms.  The efficient markets hypothesis 
states that if a market is efficient, prices should reflect an asset’s fundamental worth.  
Or, by another definition, arbitrage should correct any mispricing within the market.  
With limited opportunities for arbitrage or short selling that (in theory at least) may 
alleviate bubbles in financial markets mispricing appears to persist in the housing 
market with booms and slumps being the more dramatic symptoms.  
There is some debate as to how one best calculates fundamental value.  An 
accepted practice is to use some form of imputed rent (i.e. treat homeowners as 
though they were renting from themselves) as described by Muellbauer and Murphy 
(1997) and as used in the model of Weeken (2004), but there is general agreement 
that all methods of calculation are flawed in various ways.   
It is this problem that provides strong justification for an experimental 
investigation of   the topic.  A central difficulty with the use of theoretical and 
empirical analysis to identify bubbles is that of establishing what the fundamental 
                                                             
1
 IMF 2003 Country Report 03/47 
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value of property is.  One needs to identify a starting point in time when prices were 
at fundamental values from which to measure their departure.  When prices, and 
therefore expected future returns, are driven by expectations and are self-
perpetuating (as with many financial assets including housing), it is hard to state at 
any point in time what the fundamental value of the asset in question might be.  
However, in a laboratory setting fundamental value can be controlled and 
manipulated in any way the experimenter chooses.  In the experimental design in this 
chapter, fundamental values decline in order to be consistent with the majority of 
previous experimental research.  However, these declining values themselves have 
been scrutinised as having a role in the formation of bubbles so this is explored in 
the extension to the Assets 2 experiment reported in chapter 2.  Trying to isolate the 
effects of herding, regret and declining fundamental values in a single experiment 
would render the task of interpreting results prohibitively complex, so the declining 
fundamental value design is adhered to.  
 
3.  Literature Review 
3.1 Asset market experiments 
 
 This ability to control fundamental value was an important rationale for asset 
market experiments designed to investigate stock market bubbles. The seminal paper 
by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) (henceforth SSW) has provided the design 
template for a host of further experiments. Subjects act as both buyers and sellers.  
They are endowed with multiple units of an asset (referred to as X) and an amount of 
working capital.  In some experiments, a mixture of asset units and capital is given. 
In SSW, X pays a dividend each round and is worthless by the end of the experiment 
(though in some of their experiments X also carries a final buy-out value) so 
participants’ final earnings are based upon dividends and remaining capital balances.  
Dividend amounts are unknown but take one of four randomly drawn values.  The 
fundamental value of X at any point in time can be calculated by working out the 
expected dividend value per round multiplied by the number of rounds remaining. 
Participants are free to trade in X over 15 rounds by posting bids and asks in a 
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computerised double auction. In SSW bids and asks were entered by participants and 
the highest bids and asks only in each round were displayed on their computer 
screens.  The theoretical prediction is that prices should track fundamental value as 
participants backwardly induct and base bids in each round upon expected dividend 
flows from remaining rounds. In SSW and other experiments that followed there is a 
robust finding of sustained bidding above the fundamental value of the asset 
particularly after the first few rounds and a ‘crash’ back to fundamental value 
towards the final round.  Further examples of the phenomenon can be found in  Van 
Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1992), Camerer and Weigelt (1990) Porter and 
Smith (1995) and a complete survey of the literature is provided  by Sunder (1992).  
There is a consistent finding that bubbles disappear with experience; typically by a 
third repetition participants in experiments learn to track fundamental values.  
Explanations abound for the phenomenon.  A few subsequent experiments that 
sought to further explain the laboratory bubbles are particularly relevant to this 
chapter.  
Smith et al. (2000) examined the impact of the frequency of dividend 
payments.  In a broadly similar design to that of Smith, Suchanek and Williams, they 
compared three treatments: A1 where a single randomly determined dividend is paid 
at the end of the trading horizon; A2, where payments are on a per round dividend 
basis (as in the seminal 1988 paper) and A3, which employs a mixture of the two.  
As hypothesised, bubbles were most prevalent in A2 and least so in A1, with A3 
falling in between the two. The A1 treatment all but eliminated bubbles; this was 
attributed to subjects holding common expectations about value.  It would appear 
from this study that bubbles may have some of their origins in divergent expectations 
about asset value created by the frequent dividend payment design and yet, outside 
the laboratory, we observe bubbles in markets with infrequent pay-outs such as the 
housing market.   
Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2001) tested the hypotheses that either the 
frequent dividend pay-out or the declining fundamental value of the asset is the 
cause of bubbles. Their subjects received per-round dividend payments as in SSW 
but, in addition, they introduced a fixed and known buy-out value for their units of 
asset X at the end of the final round.  They concluded that frequent dividend 
payments, coupled with a finite time horizon, increase the number of possible 
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outcomes by continuously altering the fundamental value, causing divergent 
expectations and allowing bubbles to form more easily.  Of significance also, was 
their conclusion that a constant fundamental value, whist possibly reducing the 
magnitude of bubbles, was not sufficient to eliminate them.  
Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) carried out an experimental test of the idea 
that bubbles are caused by speculation fuelled by a lack of common knowledge of 
rationality (i.e. the idea that some ‘sucker’ will buy the asset for more than you did 
so one can pay above the fundamental value and still expect to make a profit).  
Treatments in which subjects were allocated roles of seller or buyer and where there 
was no opportunity to re-sell the asset were compared to a baseline along similar 
lines to the Smith, Suchanek and Williams seminal work.  Further, the ‘active 
participation hypothesis’ (that much trading activity is inspired by protocol or takes 
place because subjects have nothing else to do) was explored by having a dual 
market set-up in some treatments where a resale market operates parallel to the no-
speculation one and subjects are able to participate in both, one or neither of the 
markets.  Their results provided evidence that speculation, whilst amplifying bubbles 
is not the only cause of them. Giving subjects a choice of activity did reduce trading 
volume though it did not eliminate bubbles.  Irrationality, rather than a lack of 
common knowledge of rationality, was identified as the cause for bids above FV in 
the non-speculation treatments. 
Ackert et al (2002) found that an asset with lottery characteristics (i.e. a small 
chance of a large payout/large chance of a small/zero payout) will trade further 
above fundamental value than an asset with more standard characteristics (i.e. less 
skewed payoffs).   
 
3.2 Auctions and the winner’s curse 
 
 A further influence on the experiment reported here is the body of research on 
auctions and, in particular, experimental work with first-price sealed bid, common 
value auctions.  Common value auctions are those in which the value of the 
auctioned item is the same to all bidders but is unknown at the time bids are placed.  
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First price, sealed bids auctions are those in which bids are given privately and the 
highest bidder wins the item, paying a price equal to his bid.  Reminiscent of 
findings about prices in excess of fundamental value in asset market experiments, 
participants in auction experiments consistently bid above the Risk Neutral Nash 
Equilibrium (RNNE).  This is often ascribed to ‘The Winner’s Curse’ and has been 
found in experiments such as those of Kagel and Levin (1986) Lind and Plott (1991) 
Goeree and Offerman (2002).  The winner’s curse arises in Common Value Auctions 
with incomplete information because the person who generally wins the item being 
auctioned is the one who holds the highest estimate of its value.  If one assumes that 
it is the average estimate of value that will be most accurate, the winner usually 
overpays.   In a housing market, it may not always be that the highest bidder wins as 
other factors (such as the circumstances of the buyer) may override price offered, 
however it may occur sufficiently frequently to cause an upward momentum in 
prices and may certainly be a factor in other asset market bubbles.  This adverse 
selection phenomenon has been frequently found to persist even with experience.  
See for example Kagel (1989). 
Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox et al (2001) looked at common 
value auctions with the option of a ‘safe haven’ (a certain pay off that subjects can 
choose to accept rather than participate in the auction) to eliminate experimenter 
demand effects.  This is clearly reminiscent of the two-market treatments used by 
Lei, Noussair and Plott to control for the active participation hypothesis. The 
winner’s curse was much reduced by the inclusion of a positive income safe haven 
leading them to conclude that the occurrence of the winner’s curse in auction 
experiments is, in part, fuelled by experimenter demands and a lack of alternative 
profitable activity.   
 
3.3 Herding 
 
  When faced with decisions under conditions of uncertainty, it has been 
shown that people display a tendency towards herding behaviour.  There is a division 
made in the literature between rational, informational herding and more irrational 
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emotional herding behaviour and it is the latter that my experiment is concerned 
with. 
Informational herding was the theme of seminal works by Banerjee (1992) 
and  Bickshandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) which have been built upon 
theoretically and experimentally, particularly in the field of behavioural finance.  
Banerjee constructed an elegantly simple model to illustrate how copying the actions 
of others can be rational under conditions of uncertainty.  He uses the example of the 
decision faced by people choosing between two restaurants and shows how it can be 
rational to copy the decisions of others rather than using one’s own prior information 
regarding which is the better place to eat.  A large proportion of work on herding has 
centred around this form of herding for example the model of Chamley and Gale 
(2004) or experiments such as those of Sgroi (2003),  Anderson and Holt (1997) and 
Allsopp and Hey (2000). Although the general approach is to model a situation of 
asymmetric information concerning the worth of an asset or commodity, Hey and 
Morone 2004 identified such herd behaviour in a market setting using an asset with a 
known fundamental value.  However, this ‘rational’ herding will not be the focus of 
the design here.  All participants will have the same information about the final value 
of the asset and therefore have no rational reason to follow the behaviour of others. 
Collective irrationality rather than the informational herding demonstrated by 
Banerjee is blamed for volatility in stock markets in many studies.  See for example 
Shiller (1984) and (2000).  It is not far-fetched to hypothesise that herding behaviour 
of this less refined, more emotion-led type will also manifest itself in the housing 
market.  Gibler and Nelson (2003) discuss how social pressure impacts upon housing 
decisions and can override preferences.  Baddeley (2005) in her theoretical and 
empirical work on behaviour in the housing market distinguishes between rational 
and non-rational herding.  Her definition of non-rational herding allows for it to be a 
very basic human instinct to imitate and it is this very simple form of imitative 
behaviour that the experiment reported in this chapter aims to provoke. She is not 
able to separate which of the two her empirical study supports, but concludes that 
she finds evidence of the presence of some form of herding behaviour in the UK 
housing market as she finds that housing transactions respond positively to house 
price inflation. Smith (2011) found that subjects beliefs about prices in experiments 
tend to converge, whether closer to or further away from fundamental values. He 
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concludes that this is evidence of herding and clearly not of learning in an 
experimental setting.  Herding, for the purposes of this experiment, is taken to be 
following of the actions of others when there can be no rational grounds for thinking 
one is better off for doing so. 
Braga Humphrey and Starmer (2009) found limited evidence of ‘price 
following’, a tendency for participants in experimental auctions to adjust their bids to 
previously observed prices.  The definition of herding employed here closely 
matches this description of behaviour so it is interesting to see if the design 
employed by this experiment creates the conditions necessary for the manifestation 
of this tendency to occur.  In the herding treatments, there is certainly the 
opportunity to observe the bids of others. 
3.4 Emotions 
 
There is well established literature marrying psychology with economics 
signposted by seminal works such as prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979).   Prospect theory was preceded by their work on biases affecting decision 
making Kahneman and Tversky  (1974).  Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) provide a 
thorough examination of the effect of emotional factors on economic decision 
making as do Camerer and Loewenstein (2003) in their extensive paper on 
behavioural economics.     
Though emotion driven behaviour such as herding has not traditionally been 
accounted for in mainstream economics, its role in decision making is the subject of 
a significant body of work.   Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) and particularly George 
Loewenstein (2000) provide convincing arguments for the inclusion of psychological 
factors in economic models.  Lowenstein draws attention particularly to immediate 
emotions, visceral factors that impact upon economic decision making rather than 
only anticipated emotions such as regret.   
 
‘Visceral factors are transient, but the behaviors they produce have long-
lasting and important consequences both for individuals and society. In part 
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because visceral influences cause people to take extreme actions, and in part 
because important decisions induce powerful emotions in decision-makers, 
many of life’s most important decisions are made under the influence of 
intense visceral states’. 
 
The purchase of a house is intensely emotional and one imagines both 
anticipated and immediate emotions play a role in the decision making process.  In 
my own personal experience, both of these can override or alter ones pre-conceived 
ideas about what their actions will be
2
.   Behavioural finance has included a 
significant amount of research on the role of psychological influences on investor 
decisions.  The literature is well surveyed in Barberis and Thaler (2003).   
Some work on psychological biases has also been carried out specifically 
with regard to housing markets such as an experimental exploration of anchoring 
effects Northcraft and Neale (1987) and empirical work on loss aversion in sellers 
Genesove and Mayer (2001), but it is not well explored terrain. In a report on the UK 
housing market Farlow (2004) cites a number of  biases that he believes home buyers 
fall prey to; momentum reasoning, over-optimism and illusion of control to name but 
a few.   Generally they are the same biases that have been found in the behaviour of 
traders in financial markets.  Given that most house buyers are complete or relative 
novices, and will not have not gained the experience that has been shown 
experimentally to dissipate bubbles, one can only imagine the housing market 
providing even more fertile ground for such psychological factors to influence 
behaviour than financial markets.  Importantly, Farlow notes that it is over optimistic 
buyers that determine prices in the housing market.  Clearly, potential exist for house 
                                                             
2 My first experience of house buying was during a time of rising prices.  Several buyers were bidding 
on the same property and consequently the process went to sealed bids.  I ended up bidding well 
over my original budget by a considerable margin, both due to the fear of regret that I might kick 
myself for missing out by a small margin and to more immediate emotions of panic, feelings of 
competitiveness with other bidders, a sheer desire to win.  I also had decided to buy because prices 
were rising and am sure was swept up in a feeling that it was ‘time’ to buy because others were 
doing so.   
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buyers to fall victim to a ‘winner’s curse’ on a grand scale.  Hogarth et al (2011) 
conducted a field study of the relationship between emotional state and risk 
perception and found that states of arousal could reduce risk perception.  This 
correlation was found to be stronger in a real world setting than in an experimental 
one. 
In addition, there have been recent studies of the effect of manipulated 
emotions on prices in experimental markets.   
Andrande, Lin and Odean (2012) model their experiment on that of Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams, but show emotion-inducing videos to subjects before 
participation in the market.  They find that videos which induce excitement produce 
bubbles of greater magnitude than those designed to induce fear or sadness or to 
induce no emotional changes. Lahav, Yaron and Meer (2012) conducted similar 
research using videos to provoke either a positive or neutral mood and found that a 
positive mood led to larger experimental bubbles.  Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2011) conversely found that a fear-inducing clip from a horror film shown to 
subjects prior to trading increased risk aversion. 
It would appear, therefore, that the emotional state of a buyer may be a 
significant factor in determining his offer for a house and, whilst investigation of this 
is not in the remit of the experiment reported here, any potential influence of the task 
on the mood of subjects must be accounted for in the design. 
 
3.5 Feedback Conditional Regret (FCR) 
 
Since the work of Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) formalised 
regret theory, there has been a growing experimental literature in the area. 
Feedback conditional regret predicts that behaviour will be different under 
circumstances where feedback on a decision task is given than when it is not.  
Moreover, people may act in such a way so as to protect themselves from being able 
to experience regret from their decision.  The idea that people alter their behaviour in 
the present in anticipation of the regret they may feel if the outcome of their decision 
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is revealed in full (i.e. the path they chose as well as the path or paths that they did 
not) has convincing evidence behind it e.g.  Zeelenberg (1996) Humphrey (2004) 
Humphrey et al (2005).   
As regret is a negative and unpleasant emotion, it is natural to assume (and 
indeed it has been frequently observed) that people are regret-averse and may even 
be prepared to pay to avoid it.  The notion that people will pay an added amount for 
something in order not to have to experience regret  was labelled by Bell (1983)  as a 
‘regret premium’.  Larrick and Boles (1995) attempted to measure the level of regret 
aversion by calculating this premium, arriving at a figure of 10% in their experiment.  
One can think of several opportunities for regret conditional on finding out what 
might have been in the process of purchasing an asset such as a house and a feasible 
willingness to pay a premium to avoid experiencing the emotion.  For example, it is 
conceivable that one would pay a premium to avoid experiencing the regret of 
witnessing another buyer who offered a fraction more than you and getting the house 
of your dreams. It is the emotion of regret that is intended to be evoked by the 
experimental design used here.   
In the experiment that follows, FCR could be experienced in ‘regret’ 
treatments where the final value of the traded asset ‘X’ is revealed to all participants.  
If a participant who bids too low and does not manage to acquire an X discovers he 
would have been better off had he bid more and bought an X, he may subsequently 
increase his bids as there are three identical stages to participate in.  Conversely, a 
subject who buys an X and then discovers he would have been better off not buying 
it and opting for the ‘safe haven’ asset Y (with a fixed and known pay out) may 
experience regret that alters his bids downwards in subsequent stages.  Of course it 
may be the case that subjects buy an X and discover that they are better off having 
done so, or may have chosen not to buy it and discovered that they would have been 
worse off had they bought one.  The potential to ‘rejoice’ is certainly acknowledged  
in FCR theory but as it is regret that has been shown to be more greatly influenced 
by feedback, the comparisons of subjects’ decisions between treatments in the 
experiment that follows are based solely upon the impact of feedback on regret. 
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4. The Experiment 
4.1 Experimental Design 
 
The Assets 2 experiment retains some of the framework of the standard asset 
market experiment and therefore, as with asset market experiments, it has an auction 
mechanism to decide ownership of assets.  Subjects are endowed with an amount of 
working capital (in experimental currency) and their final earnings are dependent 
upon how they use this.  They participate in three identical stages to give learning 
opportunities and each stage comprises seven rounds.  The experiment has a dual 
market design with two assets offered for sale, Asset X and Asset Y.  X (in common 
with assets traded in many asset market experiments) can take one of four randomly 
determined amounts with equal probability and this is the amount for which X will 
be bought from participants who own one at the end of the experiment.  There are no 
dividend payments, just this final buy out value.  Rather than a double auction, 
where participants take the roles of buyers and sellers, participants are only allocated 
the role of buyer.  Sellers are effectively computerised and, as there are eight 
participants in each session and only seven rounds in which it is possible to buy an 
X, if all subjects in a stage opt to buy, one will not get an X.  There is no minimum 
bid, though a strong hint is given in the instructions as to how subjects might wish to 
calculate the fundamental value of X. 
Participants were  given 20 units of experimental currency at the beginning of 
each new stage.  Asset X was an asset which was determined to be worth one of four 
amounts at the end of the experiment (i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third 
stage).  The possible values of Asset X were: 9, 7, 3 or 1 unit(s) of currency.  There 
was an equal (one in four) chance of X being worth each one of these amounts as the 
value of X was chosen randomly by computer. Asset Y expired at the end of each 
round.  That meant that it had no value from one round to the next or at the end of 
the experiment.  It had a fixed cost of 1 unit of currency per round and only one asset 
Y could be purchased by each participant in each round.  In each round, participants 
needed to choose whether to make an offer to buy an asset X or whether to buy an 
asset Y.  This applied in each round unless they became an owner of an asset X.  If 
they chose to make an offer for an asset X, they were then asked to state how much 
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they were willing to pay for the asset X in that round. One asset X was available in 
each round, making a total of 7 available during each stage.  Participants could only 
own one asset X in each stage but once an X was bought they were not required to 
buy any more Y, nor could they make any further offers for an X for the remainder 
of that stage.  If participants chose to buy an asset Y or failed to bid enough to secure 
the X that was for sale and hence bought a Y by default, 1 unit of currency was 
deducted from their currency holdings.  They could can offer as much or as little of 
their currency holdings as they wished and the highest offer for X was be the one 
that was accepted.  In the event of a tie in any round (that is, if two or more 
participants made identical, highest offers for asset X), then the participant who 
received it was be randomly chosen by computer.  At the end of the experiment, the 
value of X was be determined by computer and one of the three stages was randomly 
chosen to count for real.  Hence, participants were paid according to their final 
currency holdings for that stage only.  At the end of the experiment, currency 
holdings for the stage that was chosen for payment were converted to cash on a 1 for 
1 basis, i.e. each unit held was worth £1. 
Participants were required to buy either an X or Y in each round unless or 
until they succeed in buying an X, at which point they need do no more for the 
remaining rounds.  This is how the declining fundamental of X was achieved in this 
design; the sooner an X is purchased the more will be saved by not having to 
purchase a Y in all subsequent rounds, hence the more valuable the X asset is in 
earlier rounds.  Its value declines by the cost of Y in each round 
Built in to this design, there is a safe haven option of not bidding on an X and 
simply buying a Y in each round and accepting a fixed and known payoff equal to 
the initial endowment less the cost of one Y in each of the seven rounds. The payoff 
from buying Y throughout is exactly equal to the expected payoff from buying an X 
at its fundamental value in any round.  All participants receive the same information 
about the possible value of X and, from this information, the expected value of X is 
straightforward to calculate
3
.  A key decision faced by subjects is whether to buy a Y 
                                                             
3 44332211 )()()()( xxpxxpxxpxxpEVX   
From this, the fundamental value of X can be seen to be 
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in each round and accept a fixed payoff or whether to use some of their endowment 
to buy an X of uncertain value.  If opting to buy an X, the decision becomes twofold; 
when to buy and how much to offer.  
Many features that are suspected of creating laboratory bubbles or of 
exacerbating the winner’s curse phenomenon are largely absent from this design.  
There are no dividends paid in each round, just a final buyout value and these values 
are not lottery style highly skewed payoffs; there is an equal probability of gaining 
each one of four modest amounts rather than a small chance of a large amount.  The 
research that found declining fundamental values exacerbated bubbles is taken into 
account in the design.  Although fundamental value is declining due to the 
decreasing amounts to be ‘saved’ by not being obliged to purchase further units of Y, 
the amount by which it falls is very stable and clear and most importantly the 
expected value of X remains the same throughout.  This, and the fact that all subjects 
receive identical information about the value of Asset X, gives no reason to expect 
divergent expectations about value although errors in calculation are of course 
possible.  There is no resale market as such.  The X is bought by the computer 
effectively and the expected value of the buyout is fixed.  This is not quite the same 
as experimental asset markets where divergent expectations were due to a lack of 
common knowledge of rationality and the belief that human error, irrational 
behaviour may allow one to re-sell an asset for an amount in excess of its 
fundamental value. The dual market design provides a ‘safe haven’ option of 
purchasing Y throughout the experiment so that subjects to not feel they are forced to 
purchase an asset X to gain a higher payoff. 
The novelty of the design used here lies in the use of a single asset rather than 
multiple units, rendering the decision to enter the market an irreversible one.   The 
purchase of asset X could be said to represent the decision therefore to make a house 
purchase and the purchase of Y the decision to rent.  Of course by default one 
generally rents whilst not a homeowner and this fact is captured in the enforced 
purchase on one of the assets in each round.  The overall aim is to investigate 
whether the potential to experience regret positively affects what participants are 
                                                                                                                                                                            
FVX = EVX + Y(r) where r is the number of rounds remaining.   
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willing to pay for an asset and whether the opportunity to see what others are doing 
leads to a tendency to copy the highest bidder.  The aim is not to recreate 
experimental bubbles that have been so frequently observed, but rather to see if the 
described manipulations affect decisions in a way that may suggest regret and 
herding behaviour could be contributing factors in bubbles.  As an implied 
consideration, it asks whether these psychological factors can in part explain the 
tendency for asset values (such as house prices) to detach from fundamentals. 
The experiment employs a 2 x 2 factorial design, allowing between session 
comparisons.  There are four treatments: Baseline, Regret, Herding and HerdReg. 
 
 
     Regret 
   
Herding 
 
 
         BASELINE 
 
 
             N, N 
 
         5 Sessions 
         REGRET 
 
 
            N, Y  
 
        5 Sessions 
         HERDING 
 
 
             Y, N 
 
         5 Sessions 
        HERDREG 
 
 
             Y, Y 
 
         5 Sessions 
25 
 
A description of the treatments follows
4
. 
Treatment 1 - Baseline  
Participants were asked to buy one of either asset X or asset Y in each round, unless 
or until they had purchased an X asset.  If an X asset were purchased, there were no 
further decisions required during that stage.  In every round where an asset X was 
not owned, a deduction was made from the participant’s experimental currency to 
pay for the purchase of a Y asset. 
Participants were not informed of the drawn value of X for any stage until the end of 
the experiment, nor were they given any information about the actions or bids of any 
of the other participants.  Only participants who purchased an X were given feedback 
as to its value.  Therefore participants were only informed as to whether they had 
bought an X at the end of each round and of their balance of experimental currency. 
 
Treatment 2 - Regret 
The decision between purchasing an X or a Y asset was the same as in the baseline 
treatment.  However, participants were informed of the value of X at the end of each 
stage regardless of whether they had bought one or not.  This meant that they were 
able to ascertain whether they may be have been better off  buying X if they did not 
do so (though this also depend upon what they would have paid for it).  It also 
clearly allowed those who did buy an X to discover if they had made the right 
decision, i.e. were better off from doing so.  Opportunities for both regret and 
rejoicing exist in this treatment and participants should be aware of the potential to 
experience either as it was clear in the instructions that the state of the world (value 
of X) would be fully revealed.  
 
Treatment 3 - Herding 
Participants were kept informed on their screens of all offers made for X assets, so at 
the beginning of each round, they were able to observe all offers made by other 
                                                             
4
 For full instructions see appendix 2 
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participants during the previous round.  As in the baseline treatment, the value of X 
is not revealed until the end of the experiment. 
 
Treatment 4 – HerdReg 
This is a combination of treatments two and three.  Participants are informed both of 
all participant’ offers for X in each rounds and also of the drawn value of X at the 
end of each stage whether or not they had bought one. 
 
4.2 Experimental procedure  
 
The experiment was run on campus at the University of East Anglia during 
June 2008.  Participants were all students, recruited by email from an array of 
disciplines and numbered 160 in total, divided into groups of 8 to a session.  20 
sessions were run in total comprising 5 sessions of each of the four treatments. 
Average payments were around £16 and sessions lasted about an hour. 
Participants were endowed with 20 units of experimental currency which 
converted to £s in a 1 to 1 ratio so effectively they were endowed with £20.  X took 
one of the four following buyout values £9.00, £7.00, £3.00 or £1.00 so the expected 
value of X was £5.00 in each stage of every treatment and Y, which expired at the 
end of each round, cost 1 unit of currency.  At the end of each experimental session, 
one of the stages was randomly selected to be the payment stage and count ‘for real’ 
so participants had an incentive to behave optimally in every stage.  Subjects 
completed a pre-experiment questionnaire on paper to check their understanding of 
the experimental task
5
. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999)  
 
 
                                                             
5
 See appendix 1 
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5. Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1- Learning 
As there are opportunities for learning in this design and bubbles have been 
repeatedly show to dissipate with repeated markets then bids and market prices 
should be progressively lower through the three stages in all treatments.  Even in the 
baseline treatment, some very limited feedback is given in that participants know if 
they succeeded in buying an X in every round if they bid for one. 
Hypothesis 2 – Baseline treatment 
In treatment one, the baseline treatment, there is neither feedback on one’s own 
actions nor any information about what others are doing.  Given that all suspected 
causes of laboratory bubbles have been eliminated from the design, the expectation 
is that this treatment will not give rise to bids or market prices for asset X above 
fundamental value.    
Hypothesis 3- Feedback Conditional Regret 
One would expect that if there is a regret effect and people are prepared to pay a 
‘regret premium’ mean offers for X and market prices in this treatment should be 
greater than those in the baseline treatment. The nearness of bids and prices to 
fundamental value or the amount by which this premium takes bids or market prices 
above fundamental value and into bubble territory will reflect the magnitude of 
anticipated regret when compared to bids and market prices for X in the baseline 
treatment.  It is predicted that a regret effect will result in higher mean bids and 
market prices in the treatments with regret than in those without.   
 
Hypothesis 4 - Herding 
The predictions for the herding treatment are less clear cut.  One could expect to see 
a rapid convergence towards low bids, particularly after the first stage if subjects 
begin to collude, but nevertheless, the hypothesis is for there to be a tendency 
towards higher bids and prices overall than the baseline as some subjects follow the 
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highest bidders who win the X in early rounds and are motivated to raise their own 
bids.   There is a theoretical possibility of collusion in herding treatments, which 
could cause bids to fall below even those of the baseline treatment.  Rather than 
hypothesise this as an expected outcome of the design, it is noted that this is a 
possibility but is not expected and will be discussed further in light of the results. 
 
Hypothesis 5 – Interaction effects 
The results for treatment four which incorporates both the feedback and information 
provision of the regret and herding treatments, HerdReg will depend upon the 
existence of any interaction effects.  If the temptation to herd is somehow magnified 
by the opportunity to experience regret, perhaps because we would feel more 
responsible for any regret if we went against the crowd.  The direction of causality 
could be also be reversed and it could be that the potential regret one could 
experience if one tried and failed to buy an X might be made more salient when one 
can see the behaviour of other participants.  The fact that others may out-bid you and 
how you may feel if they do perhaps becomes more obvious if one can observe their 
actions. If there is an interaction effect, whilst it may not be possible to do more than 
speculate as to its origins in this design, it seems important to ascertain if such an 
effect exists. 
One would expect at least a higher market price and mean bids for Asset X than in 
the baseline treatment and, if a positive interaction effect is present, these variables 
would be higher than in either the regret treatment or the herding treatment.   
 
6. Results and analysis 
 
Before focusing on the hypotheses, one interesting finding should be 
mentioned. Without exception, mean and median offers for X assets were under 
fundamental value, though the market price regularly went above it.  Participants 
showed good understanding of the fundamental and expected value of X in 
answering the pre-experiment questionnaire but seemed to focus only on the possible 
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buyout value of   X, rather than its expected or fundamental value, when making 
offers.  This was most prevalent in the baseline treatment as can be seen in Fig.1.  
Although this leads to a general support for the prediction that fewer or no bubbles 
would be seen in this treatment it is surprising as most participants demonstrated that 
they understood that by buying an asset X, they would obviate the need to purchase 
any more asset Y.  They were asked to calculate earnings based upon the purchase of 
an asset X in a particular round at a particular price assuming a particular final 
buyout value for X.  In their answers, the majority of subjects understood that they 
would buy Y only if they did not own an  X and that the fundamental value of X was 
its expected buyout value, plus Y multiplied by the number of rounds remaining.  
Despite this, when it came to bidding for an asset X, many subjects behaved as if 
they were bidding on the expected value of X rather than its fundamental value.  
Generally, participants chose to invest in the X asset of uncertain value even 
though the expected payoff from doing so had deliberately been made equal to that 
of buying the asset of a certain cost in each round.  Experimenter demand effects 
were minimised by the design so this can be taken to be motivated by a true desire to 
own the asset. 
 
 
Fig.1.Mean Bids/Prices Minus FV 
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Hypothesis 1- Learning 
There was a progressive decrease in mean and median bids and market prices 
for Asset X as subjects repeated the task for the second and third times. Figure two 
presents mean and median bids and market prices for each stage with data from each 
treatment pooled together. 
 
 
Fig.2. Bids and prices by stage across treatments 
 
I conducted a Wilcoxon test to see whether the differences in market prices 
and in mean bids were significant between the three stages and then conducted 
separate tests for each treatment.  The null hypothesis is that no learning takes place 
and that there are no significant differences in bids or market prices between the 
three stages.  The alternative hypothesis, consistent with previous experimental 
findings, is that subjects lower their bids with learning and therefore they become 
progressively lower throughout the stages. 
The test was therefore one tailed, as the prior belief in learning is well justified by 
experimental literature.  
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 p-value   p-value   p-value  
MeanMktPrice 
Stage 1 and 2 
.001** Mean Bid X 
Stage 1 and 2 
.314  Median Bid X 
Stage 1 and 2 
.148  
MeanMktPrice 
Stage 2 and 3 
.002* Mean Bid X 
Stage 2 and 3 
0.014* Median Bid X 
Stage 2 and 3 
.2205  
MeanMktPrice 
Stage 1 and 3 
0.000*** Mean Bid X 
Stage 1 and 3 
.024* Median Bid X 
Stage 1 and 3 
.0935  
Table 1. Mean Market Prices and bids by stage 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
 
As can clearly be seen in Table 1, the difference in bids and in market prices 
between stages 1 and 2 were not significant.  However, from Fig.2 it can be seen that 
stage 2 market prices and mean bids were lower as hypothesized. 
Both bids and market prices were significantly lower in stage 3 than in stage 2.  
These differences were in both cases, statistically significant.  It follows that stage 
three bids and prices were therefore also significantly lower than in stage 1. 
Figures 3 – 8 show mean bids and market prices for asset X across rounds by 
treatment for each stage in turn.  
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Fig.3. Stage 1 Mean Bid for X by treatment 
 
Fig.4. Stage 2 Mean Bid for X by treatment 
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Fig.5. Stage 3 Mean Bid for X by treatment 
 
 
 
Fig.6. Stage 1 Mean Market Price by treatment 
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Fig.7.  Stage 2 Mean Market Price by treatment 
 
 
Fig.8. Stage 3 Mean Market Price by treatment 
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Fig. 9. Bids and Market Prices by Treatment 
I conducted Wilcoxon tests for mean market price and mean bid broken down 
by treatment to see if there were differences in learning between the treatments. 
Again, if there were no learning the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between stages across treatments would have to be accepted and the alternative 
hypothesis that bids and market prices decline with experience would be rejected.  
Remembering the prior belief is that the variables will become progressively lower; a 
one tail test was again used. 
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4 .04* .25 ns .022* .447  .113  .113  
Table 2. Market Prices and Mean bids by Stage and treatment 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
In all treatments market prices were significantly lower in the third stage 
compared to the first.  Mean bids were only significantly lower in the baseline 
treatment in a comparison between stage 3 and stage 1.  This still provides evidence 
of learning, but indicates there may be some interference in the learning process 
from the conditions in the other treatments.   
Hypothesis 2- Baseline treatment 
In the baseline treatment, mean and median offers for X and market prices 
across all stages were below fundamental value.   Hypothesis two is therefore 
generally confirmed by the absence of market prices in excess of fundamental value 
in this treatment across all three stages 
Taking the results stage by stage (remember bubbles in asset market experiments are 
usually much reduced by stage two and entirely dissipated by stage three).  Figs. 3 
and 6 show stage 1 results.  It can be seen from figure 3 that after beginning under 
fundamental value (as is a common finding in many asset market experiments) 
market prices almost track fundamental value for a significant number of rounds 
before sinking below it towards the final round.  There is a ‘blip’ towards the end 
(perhaps suggesting last minute panic bidding on behalf of some subjects).  Prices 
and bids decline through the next two stages in this treatment as was the trend across 
all treatments.  This more detailed breakdown of prices and bids by stage also 
loosely supports hypothesis 2 that one would not expect to see prices and bids above 
fundamental value in this treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 3- Feedback Conditional Regret 
The null hypothesis is that mean bids and market prices will not differ 
significantly between treatments 1 and 2 i.e. that feedback conditional regret does 
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not impact upon the amount offered or the market price.  The alternative hypothesis 
is that the knowledge that one will discover the value of X regardless of whether one 
has purchased the asset or nor, will drive bids and market prices higher. One tailed 
tests were conducted due to this prior belief that the potential to regret would have an 
upward impact on bids and prices. 
It is apparent from fig.1 that mean market prices and bids were higher in the 
regret treatment (2) than in the baseline treatment (1).  The results of Mann Whitney 
Tests are presented in table 3.   
Mean and median bids were significantly higher at the 10% level in treatment 
2 than treatment 1 when stages were pooled together and mean bids were higher at 
the 5% level in stage 3.  Although market prices across all three stages in treatment 
two were not significantly higher than those in the baseline, they are close to 
statistical significance in stage 2 and by stage three they are significant.  This would 
be consistent with feedback effects coming into play at the end of stage 1 and being 
reinforced at the end of stage 2. 
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Treatments 1 and 2  1 and 3 1 and 4 2 and 3 2 and 4 3 and 4 
Mean Market 
Price 
.301  .377 .1255  .232  .1735  .301  
Mean Bid X .0875 .377 .1255 .058 .458 .301 
Median Bid X .082 .4575 .301 .081 .299 .2315 
Mean Market 
Price Stage 1 
.301 .458 .301 .337 .058 .232 
Mean Bid X 
Stage 1 
.301 .301 .377 .6301 .232 .173 
Median Bid X 
Stage 1 
.297 .297 .375 .123 .416 .121 
Market Price 
Stage 2 
.125 .301 .125 .299 .301 .232 
Mean Bid X 
Stage 2 
.038* .377 .125 .058 .458 .377 
Median Bid X 
Stage 2 
.0165* .335 .173 .068 .298 .3375 
Market Price 
Stage 3 
.006** .173 .038* .201 .458 .377 
Mean Bid X 
Stage 3 
.038* .087 .232 .232 .377 .458 
Median Bid X 
Stage 3 
.069 .231 .170 .228 .229 .458 
Table 3. Bids and Prices by Stage and Treatment 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
39 
 
Hypothesis 4- Herding 
The null hypothesis regarding herding is that there is no impact on bids or 
prices from being able to observe the actions of fellow participants. The alternative is 
that bids will be driven upwards as bids adjust towards those that have succeeded in 
securing an X asset.  Remember that the opportunity for collusion was noted as a 
possibility and this would drive bids in the opposite direction.  Nevertheless, a one 
tailed test was conducted. 
Although the herding treatment (3) produced data that would be broadly 
consistent with the alternative hypothesis; mean and median bids were higher than in 
the baseline treatment and lower than in regret as predicted, the differences were not 
statistically significant (except for mean bids in stage three at the 10% level).  There 
appeared to be a little more volatility in bidding, just from looking at the raw data 
but with the limited number of observations, it would be difficult to assert this with 
any confidence.   
 
Hypothesis 5- Interaction effects 
The HerdReg treatment (4) again elicited higher mean bids and market prices 
for the X asset than the baseline but again these were not generally statistically 
significant (with the exception of market prices in stage 3).  With so few 
observations and with p-values so close to significant levels, I do suspect that further 
experimental sessions may have produced statistically significant differences 
between treatments one and four.  This treatment produced the highest market price, 
indicating that at least for some subjects, the combination of being able to observe 
the bids of others and knowing that the value of X would be revealed if you did not 
manage to buy one made them willing to pay more than either of those factors in 
isolation.  However, it would appear that this interaction effect did not affect 
participants in general as mean bids and market prices were lower than in regret.   
 
The results above indicate the possibility of a regret effect.  Regret is found 
to significantly alter bids and market prices in treatment 2 and in the other treatment 
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containing the potential for regret, treatment 4,   market prices were significantly 
higher than in the baseline treatment in stage 3.  To test whether the possibility to 
regret a decision makes prices and bids higher in these two treatments than in those 
with less opportunity to regret decisions a further test was conducted. 
A Mann Whitney test compared bids and market prices in the two treatments 
with the regret element to those without (Baseline and Herd with Reg and HerdReg).  
For completeness, treatments with herding were compared to treatments without.   
The null hypothesis is that there is no regret effect and that bids and prices in 
treatments with the regret condition are equal to or lower than those without the 
opportunity to experience regret.  The alternative hypothesis is that the impact of 
FCR is to push bids and prices higher in these treatments. 
 
Treatment type Median Bid 
X 
Mean Bid 
X 
Market 
Price 
With regret/without (2 & 4 against 1 & 
4) 
 .0524  .048*  .145 
With herding/without (3 & 4 against 1 
& 2) 
.647 .940 .545 
Table 4. Bids and Prices by treatments 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
It can be seen from table 4 that mean bids are significantly higher in the 
regret treatments and market price is also higher (though not significantly so).  
Herding treatments where participants were informed about the actions of others 
were not significantly different to the two treatments where this information was not 
given.   
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7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Consistent with much previous research, there was evidence of learning in 
the experiment and bids followed the predicted downward path as stages progressed.  
Looking at variables across treatments is not entirely informative as evidence shows 
that bubbles, even where they occur in experiments, tend to dissipate over time.  The 
results broken down into stages were a little more supportive of hypotheses.  
Camerer and Loewenstein (2003) draw attention to the greater power of the early 
stages of many experiments, pointing out that ‘many important aspects of economic 
life are like the first few periods of an experiment rather than the last’ and citing the 
example of ’the purchase of large durables like houses’. One can assume there may 
be differences in how learning may operate in the various treatments, though with 
the limited observations available here it would be hard to find any discernible 
patterns of this nature. 
All three non-baseline treatments had a higher mean and median offer for X 
than in the baseline treatment (though this was not significant in the herding or 
HerdReg treatments). Mean and median bids for X were significantly lower in the 
baseline treatment than in Regret treatments. 
It was found that when faced with the decision of whether to invest in an 
asset of uncertain value, subjects were prepared to pay more for the asset in order to 
secure it if they were going to discover its value, regardless of whether they owned 
one at the end of the experiment.  This supported the existence of a regret effect and 
the willingness to pay a ‘regret’ premium.  As well as being willing to pay a 
premium not to have to experience regret, a participant in the regret treatment who 
bids and does not receive an X in one round may imagine that the others are bidding 
at a level much higher than they in fact are and may raise their own bid above the 
level necessary to secure the X.  It would seem to be the absence of this fear of being 
made to regret their decision that removes this pressure on bids in the baseline 
treatment.  A regret effect was further statistically supported by testing regret against 
non-regret treatments.   
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In the Herding treatment (and HerdReg), participants received a better 
indication of the general level of bidding and perhaps overshot less.  Also, in herding 
treatments the information about what others were doing may have tempered bids as 
people co-ordinated. It was also found that the opportunity to observe the bids of 
others did not cause a statistically significant increase in bid amounts or market 
prices for the asset though it did appear to exert some upward pressure on both 
variables.  Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) displayed only the highest bids and 
asks on participants’ screens.  If an element of herding is present in such 
experiments, and with the anchors around which herding might centre being the 
highest prices, it would appear to follow that overshooting fundamental value might 
be more common as a result.  Observing the bids of all other participants, rather than 
just the highest bids and asks, may not therefore have created bubbles in herding 
treatments. 
 The fact that market prices were on average higher in HerdReg could 
indicate that some subjects were affected by the interaction of regret and herding, 
even if on average participants were not.  As in auctions and both financial and 
housing markets, it is the price that the person with the highest estimate of value is 
willing to pay that dictates the market price.  Perhaps some subjects in HerdReg 
were willing to pay a higher regret premium because they anticipated they would 
regret losing out on ownership of an X more knowing that others had just pipped 
them to the purchase.  It may be simply that it evoked greater competitive feelings to 
purchase an X and not to possibly be the one subject made to experience regret. 
The experimental design produced no bubble although possibly produced 
some evidence of feedback conditional regret at work in the creation of bubbles.  
This may have been because the design controlled for several of the suspected causes 
of experimental asset bubbles.  Frequent dividend payments (Noussair, Robin and 
Ruffieux 2001),  highly skewed pay-offs (Ackert et al 2002) and resale markets (Lei, 
Noussair and Plott  2001) have all been blamed for the phenomenon.  All of these 
factors were deliberately removed from the design in order to more cleanly test for 
the effects of herding and regret.  It may be that at least one of these is an essential 
ingredient in bubbles.  It is possible herding or regret effects do partially cause 
bubbles, but perhaps they are not the catalyst.   
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Two of the strongest contenders for asset market bubble creation, at least in 
the laboratory are the use of declining fundamental values and the opportunities for 
speculation.  Technically the asset X had a declining fundamental value as more 
experimental currency was saved the sooner it was bought, but the single asset 
design differed from the usual multi-unit one so this may not have created the 
necessary confusion about fundamental value needed to create a bubble.  Speculation 
opportunities were non-existent.  In many multi-asset designs, subjects act as buyers 
and sellers and may be motivated to but above fundamental value if they believe they 
can sell at a higher price.  This would appear to be the design feature from the 
laboratory market that may be the most important in bubble creation in real markets.  
From the Dutch tulip mania, to the dot com bubble to housing market booms, the 
ability to re-sell assets at a higher price would appear to be an essential bubble 
ingredient.  It is these two design aspects that are explored in the next chapter.   
Whilst not creating any bubbles, the Assets 2 experiment has shown how a 
simple manipulation can alter the amount people are willing to pay for an asset.  
There is no change in the expected value, nor fundamental value of the asset offered 
for sale between treatments and yet, the possibility to regret your decision and, to a 
lesser extent, simply the ability to observe the actions of others has a discernible 
effect on prices. 
In real asset markets, including ones containing decisions about the purchase 
of a single large asset such as housing markets, there is certainly the possibility for 
buyers to experience regret.  This may be a contributing factor to the detachment of 
prices from fundamental value, though the evidence presented in this chapter would 
indicate that there are more significant factors and therefore much room for further 
research.   
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Appendices for chapter 1 
Appendix 1 – Pre-experiment questionnaire 
 
 
Session number…….. 
Date………….…….. 
Subject number…..… 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Please answer the following questions; 
 
1) In each round, unless I already own an X, I will buy either an Asset X or as Asset Y. 
 
True   
False  
 
 
2) If  I own an Asset X, I can buy an Asset Y in the next round. 
 
True   
False  
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3) If I make the highest unique offer of the round, I will definitely get the Asset X 
available in that round. 
 
True   
False  
 
4) If I buy an X in stage 1, I cannot buy another in stage 2 or 3. 
 
True   
False  
 
5)  Imagine you were to buy an asset X in round 3 of stage 2 for 10 units of currency and 
the asset X was determined to be worth 7 units at the end of the experiment.  If stage 2 
was the stage selected to count for real; what would your final earnings be in £s?  
 
When you have completed this, please raise your hand until somebody comes to see you.  
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ANSWER SHEET 
 
 
 
1) Answer: True 
 
2) Answer: False 
Once you own an Asset X, you can no longer make an offer for another Asset X in that 
stage, nor do you need to buy any Asset Y 
 
3) Answer: True 
 
 
4) Answer: False  
You cannot own more than one Asset X in any one stage, but each stage is separate. 
 
5) 15 units = £15 
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Appendix 2(a) Experimental Instructions – Baseline Treatment 1 
 
You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in a market setting. 
Please feel free to raise your hand at any time if there is anything that you do not understand.  
Please do not talk to your fellow participants. 
 
Duration 
 
There are three identical stages, each consisting of seven rounds.  There are eight 
participants including you and all participants take part in all stages. 
 
 
The Assets 
 
You are given 20 units of currency at the beginning of each new stage.   
There are two assets available for you to buy: Asset  X and Asset Y.  
 
Asset X is an asset which will be worth one of four amounts at the end of the experiment 
(i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third stage).  The possible values of Asset X are: 
9, 7, 3 or 1 unit(s) of currency.  There is an equal (one in four) chance of X being worth each 
one of these amounts as the value of X is chosen randomly by computer.  
 
Asset Y expires in each round.  That means that it has no value from one round to the next 
or at the end of the experiment.  It costs 1 unit per round  and only one asset Y can be 
purchased by each participant in each round.  
 
Task 
 
In each round, you need to choose whether you wish to make an offer to buy an asset X or 
whether you wish to buy an asset Y.  This applies unless you become an owner of an asset 
X.   
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One asset X is available in each round and in each round only one can be sold, making a 
total of 7 available during each stage.  You may only own one asset X in each stage and if 
you have bought one, you need not buy any more Y, nor can you make any further offers for 
an X for the remainder of that stage.   
 
In each round, unless you have already bought an X during that stage, you will first be asked 
to decide whether you wish to buy an asset Y or make an offer for an asset X. 
If you choose to buy an asset Y, 1 unit of currency will be deducted from your currency 
holdings.  If you choose to make an offer for an asset X, you will then be asked to state how 
much you are willing to pay for the asset X in that round. 
 
You can offer as much or as little of your currency holdings as you like.  The highest offer 
for X will be the one that is accepted.  In the event of a tie in any round (that is, if two or 
more participants make identical, highest offers for asset X), then the participant who 
receives it will be randomly chosen by computer.  If you make an offer for asset X that is not 
accepted, you will automatically buy an asset Y in that round. 
 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment, the value of X will be determined and one of the three stages 
will be randomly chosen to count for real.  That is to say, you will be paid according to your 
final currency holdings for that stage only. 
 
Asset X value 
 
Only participants who own an X for the chosen stage will be informed of the end of stage 
value of X.  That is to say, if you did not buy an X during the stage that is selected to count, 
you will not be informed of its value and therefore will not know what you would have 
earned had you bought an X during the chosen stage. 
 
 
Conversion Rate 
At the end of the experiment, your currency holdings for the stage that is chosen for payment 
will be converted to cash on a 1 for 1 basis, i.e. each unit you hold is worth £1, so if you 
hold 10 units you will earn £10 etc. 
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Examples  
 
1) If you buy a Y in each round throughout the stage that is chosen to count for real and do 
not own an X at the end of the stage, then your final cash holdings will be 20 - 7 = 13.   
This is your initial endowment less the cost of one Y in each round. 
 
2) If you own an Asset X your final payment will be as follows;  
 
20 minus any asset Y bought prior to owning an asset X minus the price paid for the asset X 
plus  the value of asset X for the stage chosen (determined at the end of the experiment). 
 
 
Table of example earnings 
 
Action Initial 
endowment 
of currency 
units 
 Minus 
No of 
units of 
Asset Y 
bought 
 Minus 
price 
paid for 
asset X 
 Plus 
value 
of 
asset 
X 
 = total 
earnings 
Buy a Y in every 
round 
20 - 7 - N/A  N/A = 13 
Buy an asset X in 
round 1 for 12 
units with value 
of X determined 
to be worth 9 
units of currency 
20 - 0 - 12 + 9 = 17 
Buy an asset X in 
round 7 for £5 
with value of X 
determined to be 
1 unit of currency 
20 - 6 - 5 + 1 = 10 
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Note that an asset X with a value of 7 bought in round 1 for 10 units would earn you a total 
of 17 units as no asset Y would be purchased.  The same X bought for 10 units in round 6 
would earn you 12 units, as 5 units of Y would have been bought in previous rounds. 
If you choose to buy an X, when choosing what to you wish to offer for it, you might wish to 
take into account how many currency units you would save by not being required to buy 
more units of Y for the rest of the stage as well as the potential end of stage value of asset X.  
 
Please now complete the short questionnaire to help us confirm that you have understood 
these instructions. 
 
Appendix 2(b) Experimental Instructions – Regret Treatment 2 
 
You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in a market setting. 
Please feel free to raise your hand at any time if there is anything that you do not understand.  
Please do not talk to your fellow participants. 
 
Duration 
 
There are three identical stages, each consisting of seven rounds.  There are eight 
participants including you and all participants take part in all stages. 
 
 
The Assets 
 
You are given 20 units of currency at the beginning of each new stage.   
There are two assets available for you to buy: Asset  X and Asset Y.  
 
Asset X is an asset which will be worth one of four amounts at the end of the experiment 
(i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third stage).  The possible values of Asset X are: 
9, 7, 3 or 1 unit(s) of currency.  There is an equal (one in four) chance of X being worth each 
one of these amounts as the value of X is chosen randomly by computer.  
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Asset Y expires in each round.  That means that it has no value from one round to the next 
or at the end of the experiment.  It costs 1 unit per round  and only one asset Y can be 
purchased by each participant in each round.  
 
 
Task 
 
In each round, you need to choose whether you wish to make an offer to buy an asset X or 
whether you wish to buy an asset Y.  This applies unless you become an owner of an asset 
X.   
One asset X is available in each round and in each round only one can be sold, making a 
total of 7 available during each stage.  You may only own one asset X in each stage and if 
you have bought one, you need not buy any more Y, nor can you make any further offers for 
an X for the remainder of that stage.   
 
In each round, unless you have already bought an X during that stage, you will first be asked 
to decide whether you wish to buy an asset Y or make an offer for an asset X. 
If you choose to buy an asset Y, 1 unit of currency will be deducted form your currency 
holdings.  If you choose to make an offer for an asset X, you will then be asked to state how 
much you are willing to pay for the asset X in that round. 
 
You can offer as much or as little of your currency holdings as you like.  The highest offer 
for X will be the one that is accepted.  In the event of a tie in any round (that is, if two or 
more participants make identical, highest offers for asset X), then the participant who 
receives it will be randomly chosen by computer.  If you make an offer for asset X that is not 
accepted, you will automatically buy an asset Y in that round. 
 
 
Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the value of X will be determined and one of the three stages 
will be randomly chosen to count for real.  That is to say, you will be paid according to your 
final currency holdings for that stage only. 
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Asset X value 
 
All participants will be informed of the end of stage value of X for the chosen stage, 
regardless of whether or not they own one.  That is to say, if you did not buy an X during the 
stage that is selected to count, you will still be informed of its value and therefore will know 
what you would have earned had you bought an X during the chosen stage. 
 
Conversion Rate 
At the end of the experiment, your currency holdings for the stage that is chosen for payment 
will be converted to cash on a 1 for 1 basis, i.e. each unit you hold is worth £1, so if you 
hold 10 units you will earn £10 etc. 
 
Examples  
 
1) If you buy a Y in each round throughout the stage that is chosen to count for real and do 
not own an X at the end of the stage, then your final cash holdings will be 20 - 7 = 13.   
This is your initial endowment less the cost of one Y in each round. 
 
2) If you own an Asset X your final payment will be as follows;  
 
20 minus any asset Y bought prior to owning an asset X minus the price paid for the asset X 
plus  the value of asset X for the stage chosen (determined at the end of the experiment). 
 
 
Table of example earnings 
 
Action Initial 
endowment 
of currency 
units 
 Minus 
No of 
units of 
Asset Y 
bought 
 Minus 
price 
paid for 
asset X 
 Plus 
value 
of 
asset 
X 
 = total 
earnings 
Buy a Y in every 
round 
20 - 7 - N/A  N/A = 13 
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Buy an asset X in 
round 1 for 12 
units with value 
of X determined 
to be worth 9 
units of currency 
20 - 0 - 12 + 9 = 17 
Buy an asset X in 
round 7 for £5 
with value of X 
determined to be 
1 unit of currency 
20 - 6 - 5 + 1 = 10 
 
Note that an asset X with a value of 7 bought in round 1 for 10 units would earn you a total 
of 17 units as no asset Y would be purchased.  The same X bought for 10 units in round 6 
would earn you 12 units, as 5 units of Y would have been bought in previous rounds. 
If you choose to buy an X, when choosing what to you wish to offer for it, you might wish to 
take into account how many currency units you would save by not being required to buy 
more units of Y for the rest of the stage as well as the potential end of stage value of asset X.  
 
Please now complete the short questionnaire to help us confirm that you have understood 
these instructions. 
 
Appendix 2(c) Experimental Instructions – Herding Treatment 3 
 
You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in a market setting. 
Please feel free to raise your hand at any time if there is anything that you do not understand.  
Please do not talk to your fellow participants. 
 
Duration 
 
There are three identical stages, each consisting of seven rounds.  There are eight 
participants including you and all participants take part in all stages. 
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The Assets 
 
You are given 20 units of currency at the beginning of each new stage.   
There are two assets available for you to buy: Asset  X and Asset Y.  
 
Asset X is an asset which will be worth one of four amounts at the end of the experiment 
(i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third stage).  The possible values of Asset X are: 
9, 7, 3 or 1 unit(s) of currency.  There is an equal (one in four) chance of X being worth each 
one of these amounts as the value of X is chosen randomly by computer.  
 
Asset Y expires in each round.  That means that it has no value from one round to the next 
or at the end of the experiment.  It costs 1 unit per round  and only one asset Y can be 
purchased by each participant in each round.  
 
 
Task 
 
In each round, you need to choose whether you wish to make an offer to buy an asset X or 
whether you wish to buy an asset Y.  This applies unless you become an owner of an asset 
X.   
One asset X is available in each round and in each round only one can be sold, making a 
total of 7 available during each stage.  You may only own one asset X in each stage and if 
you have bought one, you need not buy any more Y, nor can you make any further offers for 
an X for the remainder of that stage.   
 
In each round, unless you have already bought an X during that stage, you will first be asked 
to decide whether you wish to buy an asset Y or make an offer for an asset X. 
If you choose to buy an asset Y, 1 unit of currency will be deducted form your currency 
holdings.  If you choose to make an offer for an asset X, you will then be asked to state how 
much you are willing to pay for the asset X in that round. 
 
You can offer as much or as little of your currency holdings as you like.  The highest offer 
for X will be the one that is accepted.  In the event of a tie in any round (that is, if two or 
more participants make identical, highest offers for asset X), then the participant who 
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receives it will be randomly chosen by computer.  If you make an offer for asset X that is not 
accepted, you will automatically buy an asset Y in that round. 
 
You will be informed whether or not an X has sold in each round.  In each round, you will 
also be informed of the amount the asset X sold for and also of all offers made by your 
fellow participants. 
 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment, the value of X will be determined and one of the three stages 
will be randomly chosen to count for real.  That is to say, you will be paid according to your 
final currency holdings for that stage only. 
 
Asset X value 
 
Only participants who own an X for the chosen stage will be informed of the end of stage 
value of X.  That is to say, if you did not buy an X during the stage that is selected to count, 
you will not be informed of its value and therefore will not know what you would have 
earned had you bought an X during the chosen stage. 
 
Conversion Rate 
At the end of the experiment, your currency holdings for the stage that is chosen for payment 
will be converted to cash on a 1 for 1 basis, i.e. each unit you hold is worth £1, so if you 
hold 10 units you will earn £10 etc. 
 
Examples  
 
1) If you buy a Y in each round throughout the stage that is chosen to count for real and do 
not own an X at the end of the stage, then your final cash holdings will be 20 - 7 = 13.   
This is your initial endowment less the cost of one Y in each round. 
 
2) If you own an Asset X your final payment will be as follows;  
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20 minus any asset Y bought prior to owning an asset X minus the price paid for the asset X 
plus  the value of asset X for the stage chosen (determined at the end of the experiment). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of example earnings 
 
Action Initial 
endowment 
of currency 
units 
 Minus 
No of 
units of 
Asset Y 
bought 
 Minus 
price 
paid for 
asset X 
 Plus 
value 
of 
asset 
X 
 = total 
earnings 
Buy a Y in every 
round 
20 - 7 - N/A  N/A = 13 
Buy an asset X in 
round 1 for 12 
units with value 
of X determined 
to be worth 9 
units of currency 
20 - 0 - 12 + 9 = 17 
Buy an asset X in 
round 7 for £5 
with value of X 
determined to be 
1 unit of currency 
20 - 6 - 5 + 1 = 10 
Note that an asset X with a value of 7 bought in round 1 for 10 units would earn you a total 
of 17 units as no asset Y would be purchased.  The same X bought for 10 units in round 6 
would earn you 12 units, as 5 units of Y would have been bought in previous rounds. 
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If you choose to buy an X, when choosing what to you wish to offer for it, you might wish to 
take into account how many currency units you would save by not being required to buy 
more units of Y for the rest of the stage as well as the potential end of stage value of asset X.  
 
Please now complete the short questionnaire to help us confirm that you have understood 
these instructions. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2(d) Experimental Instructions – HerdReg Treatment 4 
 
You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in a market setting. 
Please feel free to raise your hand at any time if there is anything that you do not understand.  
Please do not talk to your fellow participants. 
 
Duration 
 
There are three identical stages, each consisting of seven rounds.  There are eight 
participants including you and all participants take part in all stages. 
 
 
The Assets 
 
You are given 20 units of currency at the beginning of each new stage.   
There are two assets available for you to buy: Asset  X and Asset Y.  
 
Asset X is an asset which will be worth one of four amounts at the end of the experiment 
(i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third stage).  The possible values of Asset X are: 
9, 7, 3 or 1 unit(s) of currency.  There is an equal (one in four) chance of X being worth each 
one of these amounts as the value of X is chosen randomly by computer.  
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Asset Y expires in each round.  That means that it has no value from one round to the next 
or at the end of the experiment.  It costs 1 unit per round  and only one asset Y can be 
purchased by each participant in each round.  
 
Task 
In each round, you need to choose whether you wish to make an offer to buy an asset X or 
whether you wish to buy an asset Y.  This applies unless you become an owner of an asset 
X.   
One asset X is available in each round and in each round only one can be sold, making a 
total of 7 available during each stage.  You may only own one asset X in each stage and if 
you have bought one, you need not buy any more Y, nor can you make any further offers for 
an X for the remainder of that stage.   
 
In each round, unless you have already bought an X during that stage, you will first be asked 
to decide whether you wish to buy an asset Y or make an offer for an asset X. 
If you choose to buy an asset Y, 1 unit of currency will be deducted form your currency 
holdings.  If you choose to make an offer for an asset X, you will then be asked to state how 
much you are willing to pay for the asset X in that round. 
 
You can offer as much or as little of your currency holdings as you like.  The highest offer 
for X will be the one that is accepted.  In the event of a tie in any round (that is, if two or 
more participants make identical, highest offers for asset X), then the participant who 
receives it will be randomly chosen by computer.  If you make an offer for asset X that is not 
accepted, you will automatically buy an asset Y in that round. 
 
You will be informed whether or not an X has sold in each round.  In each round, you will 
also be informed of the amount the asset X sold for and also of all offers made by your 
fellow participants. 
 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment, the value of X will be determined and one of the three stages 
will be randomly chosen to count for real.  That is to say, you will be paid according to your 
final currency holdings for that stage only. 
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Asset X value 
 
All participants will be informed of the end of stage value of X for the chosen stage, 
regardless of whether or not they own one.  That is to say, if you did not buy an X during the 
stage that is selected to count, you will still be informed of its value and therefore will know 
what you would have earned had you bought an X during the chosen stage. 
 
Conversion Rate 
At the end of the experiment, your currency holdings for the stage that is chosen for payment 
will be converted to cash on a 1 for 1 basis, i.e. each unit you hold is worth £1, so if you 
hold 10 units you will earn £10 etc. 
 
Examples  
 
1) If you buy a Y in each round throughout the stage that is chosen to count for real and do 
not own an X at the end of the stage, then your final cash holdings will be 20 - 7 = 13.   
This is your initial endowment less the cost of one Y in each round. 
 
2) If you own an Asset X your final payment will be as follows;  
 
20 minus any asset Y bought prior to owning an asset X minus the price paid for the asset X 
plus  the value of asset X for the stage chosen (determined at the end of the experiment). 
 
Table of example earnings 
 
Action Initial 
endowment 
of currency 
units 
 Minus 
No of 
units of 
Asset Y 
bought 
 Minus 
price 
paid for 
asset X 
 Plus 
value 
of 
asset 
X 
 = total 
earnings 
Buy a Y in every 
round 
20 - 7 - N/A  N/A = 13 
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Buy an asset X in 
round 1 for 12 
units with value 
of X determined 
to be worth 9 
units of currency 
20 - 0 - 12 + 9 = 17 
Buy an asset X in 
round 7 for £5 
with value of X 
determined to be 
1 unit of currency 
20 - 6 - 5 + 1 = 10 
Note that an asset X with a value of 7 bought in round 1 for 10 units would earn you a total 
of 17 units as no asset Y would be purchased.  The same X bought for 10 units in round 6 
would earn you 12 units, as 5 units of Y would have been bought in previous rounds. 
If you choose to buy an X, when choosing what to you wish to offer for it, you might wish to 
take into account how many currency units you would save by not being required to buy 
more units of Y for the rest of the stage as well as the potential end of stage value of asset X.  
 
Please now complete the short questionnaire to help us confirm that you have understood 
these instructions. 
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Chapter 2 
Assets 3 Experiment 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The experiment reported here intends to extend the research described in the 
previous chapter by considering the impact of speculation on bubbles.  Given that the 
experiment in the previous chapter was partially motivated by housing market 
bubbles where opportunities for speculation could potentially play an important role 
in bubble formation, a natural extension to the research would seem to be the impact 
of speculation in an experimental market. The impact of speculation has been 
previously examined in asset market experiments where the existence of a resale 
market has been found to greatly exacerbate bubbles in the laboratory. The Assets 3 
experiment will attempt to assess the role of speculation in bubbles, maintaining the 
use of a single, lumpy asset as in Assets 2 and with participants acting as both buyers 
and sellers. 
The experiment will investigate whether speculation or fundamentals (or 
both) may be the driving force behind price bubbles in the housing market.  This will 
be achieved by comparing market prices in a treatment where there is no opportunity 
for re-sale with one in which there is. It will also investigate the impact of rising 
fundamental values against constant ones and the effect of rising fundamental values 
on speculation and market prices. 
Although traditionally, fundamental values in asset market experiments 
decline throughout rounds, this is perhaps a less good approximation of the housing 
market than increasing values.  The supply of housing, which is already struggling to 
meet demand, could be expected to become even less adequate in the future as the 
impact of a rising population and changing demographics (e.g. more single 
occupiers) puts increasing pressure on a limited and relatively inelastic supply.   For 
this reason, it seems more realistic to model fundamental values as rising rather than 
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falling over time.  Whether the increases in fundamental values are contributing to 
bubbles will be examined by comparing market prices in treatments with rising 
fundamental values with treatments in which they are constant.  Using constant 
rather than decreasing fundamental values in two treatments will provide a cleaner 
way of isolating the effect of increasing fundamental values.   
In his General Theory, Keynes (1936, pp. 154–5) asserts that fundamentals 
are not the determining factor in asset prices, but that investors are instead 
‘‘concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man who buys it ‘for 
keeps’, but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass 
psychology, three months or a year hence.’’  Rational expectations would predict 
that subjects in an experiment where an asset has a calculable or known fundamental 
value should only be prepared to buy the asset as this value.  Even with the presence 
of a resale market, RE would predict that subjects would expect other participants to 
only value the asset at its fundamental worth and therefore would not pay more than 
this for it in the expectation that someone would pay a yet greater amount for it in a 
subsequent experimental round.   These two somewhat conflicting views are 
considered in the experiment’s design where a resale market exists in two of the four 
treatments, allowing participants to sell on an asset at whatever price they can 
achieve, regardless of whether this is above or below its fundamental value. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Fundamental value 
 
The seminal paper by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) (described in the 
previous chapter) and the majority who followed in a similar vein used a design 
where the asset or assets traded had a declining fundamental value.  The usual 
finding of declining fundamental value designs has been that bubbles tend to be 
created in the laboratory setting, though are dissipated by experience. This had led 
some to claim that the observed laboratory bubbles were created as a result of 
subjects ‘overshooting’ the declining value. This assertion has motivated some 
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research where experimenters used an asset with a constant fundamental value and, 
more rarely, an increasing one. 
Ball and Holt (1998) devised a classroom game where participants buy and 
sell dividend-paying paper assets that have a known chance of expiry in each round 
(assets are destroyed if a number 1 is rolled with a die) and a final buyout value.  
Participants are also endowed with a cash balance and the magnitude of this, the 
dividend, the risk of asset expiry and the final buyout value render the asset’s 
fundamental value constant throughout rounds.  These games are reported to produce 
bubbles of the type observed in laboratory experiments.  Noussair et al (2001) used a 
design where fundamental values were constant rather than declining and also 
managed to generate bubbles in a laboratory setting. Their experimental design 
included varying the cash to asset ratio as well as comparing declining and constant 
fundamental values.  They found declining values to be a cause of bubbles in 
experimental markets, largely because subjects did not understand the declining 
nature of assets’ fundamental value and believed them to be constant. They also 
found that the frequency with which dividends were paid had a positive effect on 
bubbles.  Bostian et al (2005) also examined the impact of using an asset with a 
constant fundamental value and, like Noussair et al (2001), concluded that frequent 
dividend payments were a cause of bubbles.  In addition, they found that the length 
of trading period was significant, more bubbles were created during longer periods 
during which wealth could be accumulated.  Bubbles were also more prevalent, the 
more cash participants were endowed with. 
 
Davies (2006) replicated previous findings of laboratory bubbles using an 
asset with a declining fundamental value and then introduced an asset with an 
increasing fundamental value.  The increasing value was achieved by the use of an 
asset that either paid a dividend or required a maintenance payment at the end of 
rounds, with the expected outcome being a small maintenance charge being paid 
rather than a dividend being received.  The holding value of the asset, therefore, 
increases with each round that passes.  He hypothesised that as, in his opinion, 
bubbles were caused by an overshooting of fundamental value, then an increasing 
value would produce undershooting and generate prices below fundamental value. 
This is indeed what he found occurred in the experiment. 
72 
 
Noussair and Powell (2010) used a design which allowed for fundamental 
values to increase and decline by means of varying taxes, dividends and buyout 
value.  This created ‘peaks and valleys’ of fundamental value in rounds which they 
argue, given the cyclical nature of economic variables, is a more accurate reflection 
of the behaviour of assets in real markets. They found that average prices generally 
overshot fundamentals but there were key differences between valley and peak 
treatments.  Peak treatments, where fundamental value increased and then decreased, 
produced results in keeping with previous research.  Prices were above fundamentals 
but tracked them accurately in terms of direction, especially with experience.  Valley 
treatments, where values decreased and then increased, produced less consistency, 
even with experience.  Subjects did not successfully track fundamental value either 
in direction or magnitude even with opportunities for learning. However, Kose 
(2011) found that the critical factor in bubble creation was the existence (or not) of a 
final buy-out value for the asset rather than the direction of fundamental value.  In 
treatments where the experiment was of an indefinite duration without an end value, 
transaction prices were significantly lower than in treatments of known duration with 
a buy back value.  His experiment included increasing and decreasing fundamental 
value treatments and the finding held across both. 
 
At least some evidence appears to suggest that laboratory bubbles may be the 
product of experimental design, in particular the use of an asset with a declining 
fundamental value could be a contender for explaining the phenomenon.  If subjects 
are merely failing to accurately calculate the fundamental value or failing to update 
their information each round when the value is declining, this may suggest that 
ensuring the fundamental value is known, or leaving it constant may produce less 
deviation from an experimental asset’s true value.  Of course, there is sometimes 
justification for the declining fundamental design on the grounds of external validity, 
depending on the nature of the asset and/or circumstances one is trying to 
experimentally represent.  Part of the motivation for the research reported here are 
the bubbles observed in housing markets and therefore there is certainly a 
justification for the use of non-declining fundamental values if one is trying to 
approximate the real world market in the laboratory.  
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2.2 Resale markets 
Implicit in the conclusions of Smith, Suchanek and Williams, is that bubbles 
may occur even when all subjects are supplied with identical information about an 
asset’s fundamental value due to subjects’ beliefs that other participants may act 
irrationally and hence, may purchase an asset for a price above its fundamental 
value.  This lack of common knowledge of rationality would clearly constitute a 
violation of rational expectations.  
Tirole (1982) constructs a model using a rational expectations equilibrium 
(REE) which demonstrates stronger theoretical evidence against the possibility of 
speculation under rational expectations than merely the assertion that subjects 
oughtn’t to doubt the rationality of others under RE.  However, there appears to be 
experimental evidence of precisely this violation of RE.  Lei, Noussair and Plott 
(2001) sought to explain the phenomenon of laboratory bubbles by attributing them 
to speculation.  More specifically, they were interested in exploring speculation 
based upon doubts of the rationality of other traders in the experiment and the hope 
of exploiting this by selling an asset at a price above its true value.  Naturally if one 
holds a belief that one can sell an asset for a price in excess of its fundamental value, 
one will be willing to pay a price in excess of this value (even if the value is known) 
so long as the participant believes it may be sold for an even higher price in a 
subsequent trading round.  Their ‘nospec’ treatments, where there was no 
opportunity for resale of the asset still gave rise to bubbles and led them to conclude 
that speculation was not therefore a necessary condition for the existence of 
laboratory bubbles. Given this result, it follows that the lack of common knowledge 
of rationality could not have been the cause of bubbles observed in treatments where 
speculation was not possible. 
Smith (2011) found evidence of both herding and speculation in an 
experimental asset market.  Speculation was identified in participants who were 
asked to make a prediction about future asset prices and demonstrated that they 
understood fundamental value but then deliberately bought into a bubble by paying a 
price higher than this value.  Perhaps importantly here, he observes that even well-
informed traders do not predict that prices will converge to fundamentals in the long 
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run, with the implication that they must have some doubt about the rationality of co-
participants.   
The role of the lack of common knowledge of rationality in bubble creation 
via speculation is also at the heart of a working paper by Akiyama, Hanaki and  
Ishikawa (2012).  They explore the idea that bubbles are the result of both individual 
rationality and the lack of common knowledge of rationality by replacing 
participants in one treatment with computers.  By leaving only a single human 
subject, they eliminate the possibility of uncertainty about the rationality of the other 
traders affecting his decision making.  This means that any deviation from 
fundamentals can be attributed to individual irrationality.  The other treatment is run 
with all human participants and deviations in that treatment, it is argued, must be a 
result of both individual rationality and lack of common knowledge of rationality.  
They also ask participants for forecasts of trading prices and find that the participants 
in computer treatments quickly adjust their predictions to fundamental values unlike 
participants in the all-human treatments.  Hence, it seems that the uncertainty about 
the rationality of others is driving the persistent deviation from fundamentals. 
 
2.3 Learning and confusion 
 
Almost as robust as the finding of asset market bubbles in the laboratory is 
the finding that they tend to disappear with experience.  Generally subjects learn 
fairly rapidly that values have lost track of fundamentals and prices tend to converge 
within a few rounds.  Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007) used subjects price 
predictions to measure the degree of learning that takes place.  They found 
expectations to be adaptive and hence bubbles diminish as information is updated 
with each market that subjects participate in. 
It has also been shown that the presence of a relatively small number of 
experienced or well-informed traders can inhibit bubble formation and there is 
evidence that inexperienced or irrational traders in experimental markets can skew 
results in a way that would not occur if all participants were economists.  
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005) examined the impact of mixing 
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experienced and inexperienced traders and reported that even including just a 
proportion of experienced traders can dissipate bubbles. Hargreaves and Zizzo 
(2011) found that traders with an economics background outperformed those 
without.  It may be that there are not enough well-informed or experienced traders in 
real markets to prevent trading above fundamentals.   Xie and Zhang (2012) found 
that introducing a steady stream of new traders in an experiment created so much 
noise that learning was obstructed and deviation from fundamentals continued.  
Learning did not necessarily dissipate bubbles in the valley treatments of Noussiar 
and Powell.  It appeared that subjects became confused about the fundamental value 
of assets during this phase of the experiment.  Kirchler, Huber and Stockl (2011) 
found that the declining nature of assets in experiments were a potential cause of 
bubbles.  Subjects expected fundamental values to be constant and therefore overshot 
the true value.  Perhaps real world traders make the same error, at least to an extent.  
House prices seem to rise far more readily than they fall for the most part (even 
during the recent lengthy recession, they have perhaps not reverted quite to 
fundamental values if estimates of a 30% overvaluation are to be believed).  
Some studies have attempted to unravel the learning process observed in the 
laboratory asset markets; Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008) found that changing the 
parameters of the experiment can lead experienced subjects to rekindle bubbles e.g. 
injecting by more cash and more uncertainty.  Perhaps this may be more 
representative of real markets as they are dynamic and variables are constantly 
changing.  If more credit is suddenly available, this may well have an impact upon 
the markets for houses and other assets and if future asset values seem more 
uncertain, then perhaps there is greater opportunity for speculation. 
It would appear then that subject confusion could be a cause of some 
experimental results. There is perhaps less literature on the subject than there ought 
to be, but the possibility is considered in a reasonable proportion of the literature and 
some have more specifically tried to address the issue.  Lei and Vesely (2009) aimed 
to show that learning is not necessary for bubble dissipation; rather that adequate 
instruction on the nature of the asset and the dividend structure will prevent their 
formation.  By allowing participants to observe a market before participation, they 
eliminated bubbles from the ‘live’ market as subjects were apparently well-informed 
from the outset of trading as to what fundamental values were.  Huber and Kirchler 
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(2012) examined the way in which fundamental values were presented to subjects 
and found that giving them the values as a graph instead of in a table led to a 
reduction in price deviations from fundamentals.  In addition, subjects were asked 
what the fundamental value of an asset would be in the subsequent round as they 
participated and this also reduced deviations. 
3. Experimental design 
 
The experiment is of a 2x2 factorial design.  An asset ‘X’ is traded in an 
experimental market consisting of ‘buyers’ (participants endowed with experimental 
currency) and ‘sellers’ (participants endowed with a lesser amount of currency than 
buyers plus a single asset X).   The experiment is divided into three identical stages 
of 7 rounds so there is opportunity for learning. 
 
 Constant FV Increasing FV 
No Resale Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Resale Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
 
 In keeping with the majority of asset market experiments, in the Assets 2 
experiment reported in the previous chapter there was a declining fundamental value 
which was achieved by the inclusion of a ‘rental’ market for a second asset ‘Y’.  In 
Assets 3, as fundamental values are required to be increasing, there will be no rental 
market.  An increasing fundamental value will be achieved by the introduction of a 
per-round maintenance charge attached to X in the two treatments that require it.  In 
the constant fundamental treatments, this charge will simply be omitted. 
Whoever owns an asset X in any round is required to pay the maintenance charge for 
that round.  Whoever holds an X at the end of the final round receives the buyout 
value which is randomly determined, though takes one of 3 known possible values of 
5, 10 or 15 units. 
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Increasing fundamental value (IFV) treatments 
 
Buyers are allocated 20 units of experimental currency and sellers are 
allocated 17 units of experimental currency, plus one asset X with and expected final 
buyout value of 10.   
 Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Round 
3 
Round 
4 
Round 
5 
Round 
6 
Round 
7 
EVX 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Charge 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cumulative 
charge 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
FVX 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Any participant who does nothing would expect to earn 20 units of currency.  Some 
examples are given below. 
Buyers 
Action: Buy X in R1 for 3 units  
Payoff:  20-3 (endowment minus cost of X) = 17 minus the charge of 7 for holding 
an X for seven rounds   = 10. Expected value of X is 10, so the payoff would be 20. 
Action: Buy in R4 for 6 units  
Payoff: 20 - 6 - 4 +10 = 20 
Sellers 
Action: Sell in R1 for 3 units  
Payoff: 17 +3 = 20 (Endowment of 17 plus price of X received)  
Action: Sell in R4 for 6 units  
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17 – 3 + 6 = 20 (Endowment minus charge for holding X for three rounds plus 
selling price of X) 
20-6 = 14 + 6  = 20  
 
Constant fundamental value (CFV) treatments 
The expected value of X is 10 throughout and the fundamental value of X is equal to 
this. Buyers are allocated 20 units of experimental currency and sellers are given 10 
plus the X asset. 
 
Resale/No Resale treatments 
In No resale treatments, only one transaction per stage (of seven rounds) per buyer or 
seller is permitted. In Resale treatments, assets can be traded as many times as 
participants wish during each stage (though limited to one transaction per round, per 
participant due to the design of the computer programme). 
In all treatments, the fundamental value of X is given on the screen at the beginning 
of each round.  Participants are able to see offers and asks made by others. 
 
Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses are tested in the Assets 3 experiment relating to fundamental 
value, Speculation and opportunities for learning and their effects on experimental 
asset market bubbles, 
 
Hypothesis 1- Fundamental value 
If constant fundamental values reduce the tendency to deviate from 
fundamental value, as found by Noussair et al (2001), then bids and offers in 
treatments with increasing fundamental values will deviate more from fundamental 
value than those in constant fundamental value treatments.  Unlike Davies (2006), 
79 
 
there is no prediction being made that participants will necessarily undershoot in 
increasing fundamental value treatments, only evidence of a reduction or elimination 
of deviations in constant fundamental value treatments.  A comparison of the 
deviation of bids from fundamental value in constant and increasing fundamental 
values will show whether there is evidence that the nature of the fundamental value 
employed in experimental designs is a possible cause of the frequently observed 
bubbles. 
Hypothesis 2- Speculation 
If the existence of a resale market and therefore an opportunity for speculation is a 
contributory factor in bubbles, then mean offers and trading prices will be higher in 
resale treatments than in non-resale treatments.   
Additionally, it is expected that there will be a higher volume of trades in resale 
treatments than in no resale treatments. 
Hypothesis 3- Learning 
If, consistent with previous experimental research, subjects learn to track 
fundamental value more closely with repetition, bids and offers will converge 
towards FV over stages.  Evidence of learning will be found if the deviation on bids 
and offers from fundamental value lessens through rounds. 
 
3.1 Experimental procedure 
192 participants were recruited (8 subjects per session) and 24 sessions were 
run on campus at the University of East Anglia during 2009 and 2010.  The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007).  Participants were allocated to computer terminals randomly upon arrival and 
their role as a buyer or seller was therefore also determined randomly.  Participants 
were all students from a wide array of disciplines.  After arrival and a chance to read 
through instructions, a short questionnaire was completed by subjects to ensure they 
had understood the experiment and particularly the calculation of fundamental value.  
Session lasted approximately 40-60 minutes depending on treatment and the average 
payment was £9.20. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Mean 
Offer 
8.8 5.5 9.3 6.1 7.2 7.6 6.9 
Median 
Offer 
9.2 5.7 9.4 6 7.3 7.4 7 
Mean ask 10.9 6 10.4 6.6 7.7 7.8 7.4 
 
Median 
ask 
10.4 5.8 10.2 6.5 7.6 7.7 7.3 
Mean 
Difference 
from FV 
(asks, 
offers ) 
A:  0.7 
O: -0.1 
 
 
 
 
A: 0.4 
O: 0.1 
 
A:  0.4 
O: -0.3 
 
A: 0.2 
O: 0 
 
A:  0.5 
O: - 0.1 
 
A:  0.4 
O: -0.2 
 
A: 0.6 
O: 0.1 
 
Mean 
Absolute 
Difference 
from FV 
(asks and 
offers) 
A: 1.1 
O: 0.6 
 
A: 0.8 
O: 0.5 
 
A: 0.9 
O: 0.5 
 
A: 0.6 
O: 0.7 
 
A: 0.9 
O: 0.5 
 
A: 1.0 
O: 0.7 
 
A: 0.8 
O: 0.6 
 
Mean 
Number 
of trades 
per round 
2.1 1.8 4.8 5.2 3.7 3.6 4 
Mean 
trading 
price 
10 
 
 
 
5.8 10.1 5.9 7.9 7.9 7.7 
Table 1.Summary Statistics 
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The deviation from fundamental value is presented in two ways.  The 
difference between FV and offers and asks provides an indication of whether the 
fundamental value was generally exceeded or undershot.  The absolute difference 
gives an indication of the magnitude of departure from fundamentals. From table 1 it 
is clear that there has been relatively little deviation from fundamental values on 
average. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 1-3 
Hypothesis 1 - Fundamental value 
Mann Whitney tests were conducted to see whether the increasing 
fundamental value treatments had an impact on offers and asks.   
If the null hypothesis is to be accepted, there should be no significant 
difference between deviations from fundamental value in treatments with constant 
fundamental value and those with increasing fundamental value.  The alternative 
hypothesis, that the deviation will be greater in treatments with increasing 
fundamental value, will be accepted if the deviations are significantly different.  As 
there is a belief that deviations will be greater in the increasing fundamental value 
treatments, a one- tailed test was conducted. 
Treatments 1 and 3 (CFV) are compared to treatments 2 and 4 (IFV) in table 
2.  Also reported in the table are comparisons between each individual treatment. 
 
Asking Prices Offer Prices 
Treatments P value Treatments P Value 
T1/T2 **0.001 T1/T2 **0.002 
T1/T3     0.868 T1/T3     0.712 
T1/T4 **0.003 T1/T4   *0.012 
T2/T3 **0.004 T2/T3 **0.001 
T3/T4 **0.001 T3/T4   *0.023 
T2/T4     0.499 T2/T4     0.512 
T1 and T2 against T3 and T4     0.196 T1 and T2 against T3 and T4     0.213 
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(NoResale/Resale) (NoResale/Resale) 
T1 and T3 against T2 and T4 
(Constant FV/ Increasing FV) 
**0.001 T1 and T3 against T2 and T4 
(Constant FV/ Increasing FV) 
**0.002 
Table 2. Ask and Offer Prices by Treatment 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
Difference from FV Absolute Difference 
Treatments P 
value 
Treatments P 
Value 
T1/T2 0.788 T1/T2 0.323 
T1/T3 0.654 T1/T3 0.461 
T1/T4 0.688 T1/T4 0.676 
T2/T3 0.866 T2/T3 0.339 
T3/T4 0.499 T3/T4 0.611 
T2/T4 0.614 T2/T4 0.488 
T1 and T2 against T3 and T4 
(NoResale/Resale) 
0.368 T1 and T2 against T3 and T4 
(NoResale/Resale) 
0.276 
T1 and T3 against T2 and T4 
(Constant FV/ Increasing FV) 
0.619 T1 and T3 against T2 and T4 
(Constant FV/ Increasing FV) 
0.281 
Table 3.Difference from FV and Absolute difference from FV by treatment 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
There is, as expected, a significant difference in average offers and asks 
between the CFV and IFV treatments.  Clearly, as the true average fundamental 
values were not the same (6 as compared to 10) and these values were displayed on 
computer screens, this is an unsurprising result.  It does, however, show some 
understanding of fundamental values on behalf of subjects. 
More important is to consider the deviation from fundamentals in table 3 and 
to notice that there was no significant difference in asks or offers or between 
treatments with constant or increasing fundamental values.  Absolute difference from 
fundamentals is also insignificant between treatments and, though not shown here, 
this was unsurprisingly also true for trading prices between treatments.   
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This lack of divergence is somewhat contrary to what has been observed in 
the literature.  Although clearly, the aim was to eliminate overshooting caused by 
declining fundamental values in the design, it was expected that data from treatments 
with increasing fundamental values would differ from those with constant values.  
This result is not entirely out of keeping with previous research; Noussair et al 
(2001) and Bostian et al (2005) eliminated bubbles with the use of constant 
fundamental values and Davies (2006) found increasing fundamental value caused 
prices to fall below fundamental value.  The result that no bubbles were observed is 
therefore not entirely without precedent.   
 
Hypothesis 2 - Speculation 
If the opportunity to sell on an asset to another participant causes the ask and 
offer prices to increase, there should be significantly higher prices observed in the 
two resale treatments when compared to the baseline.  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
is that there is no difference and the alternative is that prices in the resale treatments 
are higher.  
Table 2 displays the results for tests for any significant differences in asks 
and offers between resale and no resale treatments.   No significant differences exist 
and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted.  Speculation has been shown to 
possibly be driven by a suspicion that other participants may not act rationally.  
Smith (2011) found that even well informed traders expected others to bid above 
fundamentals so the fact that fundamental values were made clear to participants 
should not necessarily have inhibited the formation of bubbles.  It seems participants 
did not speculate that they could but the asset for its fundamental value or above it 
and sell it on to another participant for an even higher price.   
 
Number of trades 
Treatments P value 
T1/T2     0.451 
T1/T3     0.656 
T1/T4   *0.012 
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T2/T3   *0.033 
T3/T4     0.612 
T2/T4  **0.004 
T1 and T2 against T3 and T4 (NoResale/Resale)   * 0.007 
T1 and T3 against T2 and T4 (Constant FV/ Increasing FV)     0.071 
Table 4.Number of trades by treatment 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
As shown in table 4, the opportunity for resale did inevitably lead to a significantly 
higher volume of trade as in no resale treatments the number of transactions 
permitted were restricted to one per stage, but this was the only significant result for 
the resale hypothesis.  No apparent speculation was taking place. 
 
Hypothesis 3 -  Learning and confusion 
There is no indication that subjects were confused about fundamental value 
as suspected in previous experimental asset markets. On the contrary, there was little 
deviation from fundamentals and therefore little learning could take place.  Table 5 
below shows that there was no significant difference between offers and asks nor 
differences from FV and absolute differences from FV between stages. 
 Mean Offers Mean Asks Difference from 
FV 
Ab Diff from FV 
St 1/St2  0.121 0.366 0.688 0.712 
St1/St3 0.545 0.354 0.412 0.599 
St2/St3 0.444 0.099 0.588 0.772 
Table 5. Offers asks and differences from FV by Stage 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The two results that would appear to merit discussion are the low level of 
speculative activity and the lack of divergence from fundamental values. 
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The limited speculative activity could potentially be explained by the 
shortness of the experiment or the small pay differentials between courses of action, 
or the belief that others would be aware of fundamental value and would not pay a 
price above it. 
Lei Noussair and Plott (2001) ran additional experiments as an extension to 
their main research to test the active participation hypothesis.   As the Assets 3 
experiment was relatively quick, subjects may not have felt compelled to trade to 
stave off boredom.  If this phenomenon could have occurred in the Assets 3 
experiment, I think its effects would have been tempered by the short duration of the 
experiment, any possible subject confusion (it was safer to do nothing) and an 
element of herding behaviour as the bidding and asking behaviour of others was 
visible to participants. 
Ackert et al (2002) found that an asset with lottery characteristics (i.e. a small 
chance of a large payout/large chance of a small/zero payout) will trade further 
above fundamental value than an asset with more standard characteristics (i.e. less 
skewed payoffs).  The small pay differential between each course of action and the 
expectation of earning £10 for doing nothing at all may therefore have limited trade.  
The risk of paying higher than fundamental value and losing some of an expected 
£10 may have seemed too high when the potential financial gain was so modest.   
The results show that there are circumstances when the potential profitability 
of speculation are overridden by some other considerations in a laboratory asset 
market.  Identifying exactly which circumstances were contributory in this case, 
would take further research. It might be interesting to run the experiment with a 
larger budget so that, for example, reselling an asset could potentially earn one 
significantly more than doing nothing.  This may have more external validity as 
during economic booms, potential gains from speculation in asset markets and 
housing markets are clearly great motivators.   
The most surprising result overall is that subjects seemed to track 
fundamental value rather closely across treatments and through all stages.  No 
bubbles were formed and the differing treatments had no significant effect on 
behaviour.  The experiment was apparently well understood by almost all 
participants.  Those who failed to answer the questionnaire correctly were very few 
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in number.  Tracing the behaviour of those subjects who ‘failed’ the questionnaire, 
did not prove useful.  Some went on not to trade, some traded in line with FV, some 
not quite in line with FV. 
It may well be that a combination of factors contributed to the results,  
perhaps the most influential of which was the displaying of the fundamental value on 
the computer screen at the start of each round.   Huber and Kirchler (2012) 
eliminated bubbles by presenting the fundamental value with more clarity, relating it 
to a depleting gold mine rather than a stock market. They attributed the absence of 
bubbles to a better understanding of fundamental value due to learning opportunities. 
If they eliminated bubbles by presenting the concept of fundamental value in a less 
abstract way and the repetition of the decision making task, then the design of Assets 
3 which left participants in no doubt how much the asset was ‘worth’ in each round 
and consisted of three identical stages understandably might eliminate them too.  
Their mechanism for ensuring fundamental value was understood was similar to that 
of Assets 3 in that subjects were asked about the current fundamental value of assets 
at the start of each trading period.  Although not quite as transparent as displaying 
the value on a screen, the effect on bubble formation may apparently have been the 
same. Noussair et al (2001) certainly blamed the overshooting of fundamental values 
on a misunderstanding of their calculation.  Kirchler, Huber and Stockl (2011) found 
that subjects expected fundamental values to be constant so it was their declining 
nature that caused the overshooting.   
Lei and Vesely (2009) stressed the importance of adequately informing 
participants of the nature of fundamental value and Lei, Noussair and Powell (2010) 
certainly recognised the importance of eliminating confusion to obtain a clean result;  
“…because the  experimental procedures followed  in  asset  market experiments 
were  so carefully developed and because the theory of the lack of common 
knowledge  of rationality is so  compelling, the  issue  of  procedures  in  asset  
market experiments has not been  closely scrutinized. The research reported here 
suggests that the  phenomenon  of  bubbles  and  crashes  could  have  origins  in  
aspects  of  the methodology  of  the  experiment. If this assessment  is  correct, then  
research  is able  to  proceed  along  different  theoretical  lines  in the  attempt  to  
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understand the  general process of price discovery and the  dynamics of market 
adjustments.” (p858-9) 
Declining fundamental values and the subject confusion created by using this 
design, and also perhaps caused by the method of presentation of fundamental value, 
could be responsible for at least some of the observed price deviations in many asset 
market experiments.  That is not to say that this is not precisely what occurs in real 
markets, where participants may not know the true value of an asset that they are 
buying or selling, but the advantage of experimental asset markets is that the 
fundamental value can be controlled.  To be able to control it but then have subjects 
confused about what is actually is, would seem to negate the laboratory’s usefulness 
in this respect and designs of experimental asset markets need to take this possible 
pitfall into account.  In real markets, it would appear, that either participants have 
short memories or do not learn from their mistakes as they appear to do in a 
laboratory setting. 
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Appendix for Chapter 2 
Instructions for Treatments 1 Buyers and Treatment 4 Sellers.  Treatments  2 and 3 
contain appropriate variations from 1 and 4.  
Questionnaire follows instructions. 
 
Experimental Instructions – Assets 3 Treatment 4 Sellers Instructions 
(IFV/R/SELLER) 
 
 
 
You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in a market setting. 
Please feel free to raise your hand at any time if there is anything that you do not 
understand.  Please do not talk to your fellow participants. 
 
Duration 
 
There are three identical stages, each consisting of seven rounds.  There are eight 
participants including you and all participants take part in all stages. 
 
Asset X 
 
The participants in this experiment are initially allocated the role of either a buyer or a 
seller.  There are 4 buyers and 4 sellers. Buyers are given 20 points at the beginning of each 
new stage and no asset.  Sellers are given 17 points and one asset X at the beginning of 
each new stage. 
 
You are a seller and therefore have been allocated 17 points and one asset X. 
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Asset X is an asset which will be determined to be worth one of three amounts at the end 
of the experiment (i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third stage).  The possible 
values of Asset X are: 5, 10 or 15 points.  There is an equal (one in three) chance of X being 
worth each one of these amounts as the value of X is chosen randomly by computer.  
This means that on average one could expect the X asset be worth 10 points.  This is known 
as its expected value, calculated by adding all the possible values together and dividing by 
the number of possible outcomes. 5+10+15=30 then 30/3=10.   
 
Task 
 
In each round, you need to decide whether you wish to offer the asset X for sale.  This 
applies until you sell the asset X, if you choose to do so.  The number of assets on offer in 
each round will depend upon how many of the sellers wish to sell.  The price(s) at which 
the assets are available will depend upon what price the sellers are willing to sell for.  As 
there are 4 participants allocated the seller role, this means that there are potentially 4 
asset X’s being traded during each stage.  No participant can own more than one X at any 
one time. 
 
You will see a screen displaying any offers for asset X’s made by buyers and also any asset 
X’s offered for sale by sellers (including your own should you decide to sell it).  If you wish 
to sell an asset X for one of the amounts offered, you will have the option to click on it and 
accept the offer.  Similarly, buyers will have the option to accept any X’s offered for sale by 
clicking on those.   Any trades that take place will be displayed upon the screen.  
 
Ownership of asset X has a cost.  You can think of this cost as a maintenance charge of one 
point per round, payable at the end of each round in which you hold an X.   
It is entirely up to you whether you choose to try to sell the asset X or not.  If you sell an 
asset X, you are permitted to buy one in a subsequent round if you wish. You can sell and 
buy asset X’s as many times as you wish during each stage, though you can only make one 
transaction per round. 
 
Should you choose to offer an asset X for sale in any round, you may ask as many or as few 
points for it as you like.  Remember that on average asset X is worth 10 but there is an 
equal likelihood that it is worth 5, 10, or 15 points.  You also might wish to take the cost of 
ownership into account when deciding what you wish to ask for an asset X.  As there is a 
cost per round of owning an X, it could be said that its ‘fundamental value’ is reduced by 
the the remaining maintenance charge payable upon it.  This fundamental value of X (FVX 
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in the table) in each round can be calculated by taking the expected value of the asset (EVX 
=10) and subtracting the costs attached to owning it.  The table below shows how this 
fundamental value increases throughout  rounds as there are fewer rounds left in which a 
charge will be payable on the asset.  The fundamental value of asset X will be displayed on 
your screen during each round of the experiment. 
 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 
EVX 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Charge 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cumulative 
charge 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
FVX 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
Your Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the value of X will be determined and one of the three stages 
will be randomly chosen to count for real.  That is to say, you will be paid according to your 
final currency holdings for that stage only. 
 
Your final payment will depend firstly on whether you owned an X or not at the end of the 
last round of the stage that is chosen to count.  If you did own an asset X, your final points 
total will be made up of the value of that X (determined randomly by computer at the end 
of the experiment), plus the balance of your points from any purchases or sales made 
during the stage.  If you did not own an X in the last round of the chosen stage, your 
payment will simply be the balance of your points converted into cash (see below).   
 
Conversion Rate 
At the end of the experiment, after the X asset value has been determined, your points for 
the stage that is chosen for payment will be converted to cash on a 2 for 1 basis i.e. each 
point you hold is worth 50 pence, so if you hold 20 points you will earn £10 etc. 
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Some Examples  
1) If you did not make any sales or purchases during the chosen stage, you will end the 
experiment with 10 points plus whatever the X was determined to be worth as you will still 
be holding this.  This means you would have a final point total of either 15, 20 or 25 points. 
This is your original 17 points, minus one point per round charge for holding the X asset for 
seven rounds, plus the determined value of X of either 5, 10 or 15 points. 
These final point totals convert to either £7.50, £10 or £12.50. 
  
2) If you sold the asset X for 3 points in round 1 and did not buy an asset X in a subsequent 
round.  You would end with 20 points. 
This is your original 17 points plus the 3 points from the sale of the asset X.   
17 + 3 = 20. This would convert to £10.  
 
3) If you sold the asset X in round 3 for 5 points, then bought an asset X for 7 points in 
round 5, and X was determined to be worth 10 points you would end with 20 points. 
This is your original 17 points minus a one point charge for each of rounds 1 and 2 for 
holding the asset X, plus the 5 points from the sale of X in round 3, minus 7 points for the 
purchase of X in round 5 minus one point for each of rounds 5,6 and 7 for holding the X, 
plus the points value of the X asset. 
17 – 2 + 5 – 7 - 3 + 10 = 20. This would convert to £10 
 
Please now complete the short questionnaire to help us confirm you have understood 
these instructions. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE T4 SELLER 
 
 
1)  I must offer the asset X that I hold for sale in each round until it has been sold.  
True   
False  
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2) If I sell the asset X, I can buy another in a later round.  
 
 True   
 False  
 
3) What is the fundamental value of asset X in round 4? 
 
 
4) Suppose you sold an asset X in round 4 for 6 points and bought it again in round 6 for 6 
points during the stage that was chosen to count for real.  At the end of the experiment it 
was determined to be worth 10 points, how many points would you have at the end of the 
experiment? 
 
 
 
 
 
ANSWERS 
1) False 
 
2) True 
 
3) 6 points 
 
4) 17 – 3 + 6 – 6 – 2 = 10 = 22 
Experimental Instructions – Assets 3 Treatment 1 Buyers Instructions 
(CFV/NR/BUYER) 
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You are taking part in an experiment about decision making in a market setting. 
Please feel free to raise your hand at any time if there is anything that you do not 
understand.  Please do not talk to your fellow participants. 
 
Duration 
 
There are three identical stages, each consisting of seven rounds.  There are eight 
participants including you and all participants take part in all stages. 
 
Asset X 
 
The participants in this experiment are allocated the role of either a buyer or a seller.  
Buyers are given 20 points at the beginning of each new stage and no asset.  Sellers are 
given 10 points and one asset X at the beginning of each new stage. 
 
You are a buyer and therefore have been allocated 20 points. 
  
Asset X is an asset which will be determined to be worth one of three amounts at the end 
of the experiment (i.e. at the end of the seventh round of the third stage).  The possible 
values of Asset X are: 5, 10 or 15 points.  There is an equal (one in three) chance of X being 
worth each one of these amounts as the value of X is chosen randomly by computer.  
This means that on average one could expect the X asset be worth 10 points.  This is known 
as its expected value, calculated by adding all the possible values together and dividing by 
the number of possible outcomes. 5+10+15=30 then 30/3=10.  This could also be said to be 
the fundamental value of the asset although it could be worth more or less than this 
amount.  The fundamental value of the asset is displayed on the screen during the 
experiment and remains the same throughout. 
 
Task 
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In each round, you need to decide whether you wish to make an offer to buy an asset X.  
This applies unless you become an owner of an asset X.  The number of assets on offer in 
each round will depend upon how many of the sellers wish to sell.  The price(s) at which 
the assets are available will depend upon what price the sellers are willing to sell for.  As 
there are 4 participants allocated the seller role, this means that there are potentially 4 
asset X’s being traded during each stage 
 
You will see a screen displaying any asset X’s offered for sale by sellers and the prices asked 
for them and also any offers made by buyers (including your own should you make one).  If 
you wish to buy an asset X at one of the prices offered, you will have the option to click on 
it and buy it.  Similarly, sellers will have the option to accept any offers made by buyers by 
clicking on those.   Any trades that take place will be displayed upon the screen.   
You may only own one asset X in each stage and if you have bought one, you cannot make 
any further offers for an X for the remainder of that stage.  If you buy an asset X you cannot 
sell it again, it remains yours for the rest of that stage. 
 
It is entirely up to you whether you choose to try to buy an asset X or not.  You can offer as 
many or as few of your points as you like.   
 
 
Your Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the value of X will be determined and one of the three stages 
will be randomly chosen to count for real.  That is to say, you will be paid according to your 
final currency holdings for that stage only. 
Your payment will depend firstly on whether you owned an X or not at the end of the last 
round of the stage that is chosen to count.   
If you did not buy an asset X in the chosen stage, your payment will simply be your 20 
points converted into cash (see below).   If you did own an X, your payment will be made 
up of the value of that X, plus your remaining points (after purchase of the X asset). 
 
 
Conversion Rate 
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At the end of the experiment, after the X asset value has been determined, your points for 
the stage that is chosen for payment will be converted to cash on a 2 for 1 basis i.e. each 
point you hold is worth 50 pence, so if you hold 20 points you will earn £10 etc. 
 
Some Examples  
If you do not own an X at the end of the chosen stage, you will hold your original 20 points 
which converts to £10.   
If you spent 10 points on an X and it was determined to be worth 15, you would hold 25 
points (10 remaining points and 15 from the X) which would convert to £12.50.  
If you spent 10 points on an X and it was worth 5, you would hold 15 point which would 
convert to £7.50. 
 
 
Please now complete the short questionnaire to help us confirm that you have understood 
these instructions. 
QUESTIONNAIRE TREATMENT 1 BUYER 
 
1)  I must make an offer for an X in each round if I don’t already own one.  
True   
False  
 
2) If I buy an asset X, I can offer it for sale in a later round.  
 
 True   
 False  
 
3) What is the fundamental value of X throughout the experiment? 
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4) If you were to buy an asset X in round 4 for 8 points and it was determined to be worth 
10 points at the end of the experiment how many points would you have at the end of the 
experiment?  
 
 
 
 
ANSWERS 
 
1) False 
 
2) False 
 
3) 10 points 
 
4) 20 – 8 + 10 = 22 
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Chapter 3 
 
AN EXPERIMENTAL ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE THE EFFECTS OF ILLUSION 
OF CONTROL AND FEEDBACK CONDITIONAL REGRET IN DECISION 
MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports the findings of an experiment which separates the effects 
of feedback conditional regret (FCR) from those of the illusion of control (IOC) 
during a decision making task.  Its novelty lies in the combining of the research into 
these two distinct, but possibly related areas, whilst extending and refining some 
previous work as necessary. In particular, it explores the possibility that these 
phenomena manifest themselves in an observed reluctance to exchange or to sell 
lottery tickets.   
Experimental studies have identified a reluctance on behalf of participants to 
exchange a lottery ticket for a seemingly identical one.  Frequently, experimental 
participants have shown themselves to be unwilling to part with a ticket in exchange 
for another, even with the offer of a small incentive (Bar Hillel and Neter 1996). 
Postulated explanations include loss aversion, feedback conditional regret (FCR) and 
illusion of control (IOC).  The latter two explanations are explored in the experiment 
reported here whilst controlling for loss aversion in the experimental design. 
FCR specifically compares the impact of regret felt when one learns of the 
outcome of forgone choices with that felt when one does not have the opportunity to 
learn what might have been (e.g. Zeelenberg et al 1996). Lottery tickets have been 
used (Humphrey et al 2005) in order to explore how the possibility of experiencing 
FCR will impact upon decision making. 
The illusion of control has a large literature in the field of psychology and 
describes the belief that we hold some kind of power over outcomes or, by some 
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interpretations, that we falsely overrate our chances of success under some 
circumstances.  In particular it has been shown that a subject may be more reluctant 
to sell a lottery ticket when they have played a role in its selection (Langer 1975). 
Loss aversion could provide an alternative explanation for the phenomenon, 
if one assumes that participants in experiments view the displeasure at an outcome 
where they sell/exchange a ticket that goes on to win as greater than the pleasure 
they would experience if they exchanged and subsequently won with their new 
ticket. 
The experiment reported here uses the lottery ticket format to test for both of 
these effects separately and identifies which may have the larger impact on decision 
making.  There is also the opportunity to observe the impact on decisions when the 
conditions necessary for both IOC and FCR exist together.  Loss aversion is 
controlled for in the experimental design. 
The chapter begins by giving a summary of feedback-conditional regret 
theory’s foundations before reviewing the relevant literature on the illusion of 
control which has its origins mostly in the field of psychology.  Alternative and 
possibly relevant theoretical and experimental work is briefly summarised before 
three key, motivating papers are presented as a background to the design and 
execution of the experiment.  The results from the experiment show strong evidence 
of behaviour consistent with the experience of feedback conditional regret amongst 
subjects.  Weaker evidence for IOC is also found.  Explanations for the results and 
feasible reasons for the absence of strong IOC effects are then discussed, together 
with considerations of the experimental results’ implications for economic theory 
and the experiment’s external validity. 
Literature review 
2. Feedback Conditional Regret 
Expected utility theory in its basic form describes how decision makers 
choose between risky or uncertain prospects by weighting the utility of each outcome 
and multiplying the weights by probabilities of their occurrence. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) defined the preference axioms of completeness, transitivity, 
continuity, reflexivity, independence and monotonicity to construct a utility function 
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over lotteries.  A great deal of theoretical and experimental work has been devoted to 
investigating how people’s decisions may deviate from those predicted by EUT. 
Feedback conditional regret has been investigated, both theoretically and 
experimentally.  The building blocks were laid in the Regret Theory of Loomes and 
Sugden (1982), who describe the regret one can experience when one learns, not 
only of the outcome of a chosen path, but also the outcome of choices forgone, the 
path or paths we did not choose 
 
2.1 Regret Theory  
 
Although Savage (1951) utilised the notion of regret in his work on the 
Minimax principle, where individuals make decisions in order to minimise the 
maximum amount of regret experienceable, it was Loomes and Sugden (1982) (also 
Bell 1982) who formalised regret theory.  In contrast to purely prospect based 
theories the value of one choice is also dependent on what is rejected.  As stated by 
its authors (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, p820) 
“Regret theory rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that many people 
experience the sensations we call regret and rejoicing; and second that in making 
decisions under uncertainty they try to anticipate and take account of those 
sensations”.  Regret theory’s novelty lay in the idea that people factored the potential 
emotion of regret (or rejoicing) into their decisions.  The authors of regret theory 
considered it consistent with rational behaviour on the grounds that it is rational to 
wish that one had made a different choice if things turn out badly. 
In contrast to EUT regret theory comprises a choiceless utility function in 
that the utility derived from the outcome is independent from the means of its 
occurrence. 
This gives rise to a modified utility function ‘M’ which is a function of both the 
outcome chosen but also the outcome foregone. Regret occurs when a higher level of 
utility would have been reached had a different decision been made.  The natural 
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counterpart of regret, rejoicing, is experienced when one discovers that one would 
have been worse off with a different decision.  
The following outline of the original theory is a modified description of that 
given in Humphrey (2004, p841-2) (which in turn was taken from Loomes and 
Sugden [1982]) as I will be describing his extension to the theory in a moment. The 
Loomes and Sugden model implicitly assumes that the outcomes of options not 
chosen are revealed. 
 
There are n possible states of the world  jn SSS ........1  may occur with probability 
)1(  jj pwherep . 
There is a set X of conceivable consequences.  An action is a list of n consequences, 
one for each state of the world.  So action Ai = (xi1, ..., xin) yields consequence xij if 
state of the world Sj occurs.  In choosing between two actions Ai and Ak, if Ai is 
chosen and state of the world Sj occurs, then xij is experienced and xik is forgone.  
The modified utility received in M(xij, xkj).  If xkj > xij then M will include the effects 
of regret.  If xij < xkj then M will include the effects of rejoicing. So the decision is 
determined by: 
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Using an anticipated net advantage function  ),(),(),( ijjiji xxMxxMxx  this 
can be rewritten as 
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This function is subject to three restrictions: 
 
1) Skew-Symmetry: 
For all yx,   ),(),( xyyx    
 
Where x and y are consequences; 
 
2) Increasingness: 
For any 
  xzyzxzyx ),(),(,,,  ~ y  
The better x is and the worse y is the more rejoicing the experiencing of x will bring;  
 
3) Regret-Aversion (convexity): 
 
For any zyx ,,  where ),(),(),(, zyyxzxzyx    
A disproportionate aversion to large regrets. 
 
Experimental investigations of original regret theory where feedback on forgone 
choices is given have had mixed success in their explanation of EUT violations.  
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Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1991) produced experimental evidence of 
inconsistencies in decision making that violated the transitivity axiom and Loomes, 
Starmer and Sugden (1992) produced experimental violations of monotonicity.  
However, Starmer and Sugden (1993) explored event splitting effects as an 
alternative to juxtaposition effects (where choices are affected by their positioning in 
pay-off matrices) and found evidence that  experimental violations of transitivity 
could be explained by the manner in which events were presented to subjects rather 
than regret aversion. 
 
2.2 Other research incorporating regret 
 
Less formal models than regret theory have been the basis for, or included in, 
a significant amount of theoretical and experimental work.  Many of these have 
shown evidence that some form of regret influences decision making. 
Akin to the notion of risk aversion is the idea that people experience differing 
levels of regret aversion.  Larrick and Boles (1995) attempted to measure this 
experimentally by comparing the levels of risk aversion in an experiment where the 
outcome of the non-chosen option would be revealed with a treatment in which it 
would not.  They stated the difference to be a measure of ‘regret aversion’ and found 
a 10% regret premium (as labelled by Bell 1983) to exist.  They also point out that in 
a typical choice between a gamble and a certainty if one opts for the certainty one is 
protected from regret as the gamble will not be played out.  However in playing the 
gamble, the option foregone (the certainty) is known; hence, to protect oneself from 
regret, one must opt for the sure thing. 
.    Uncertainty aversion is a recognised experimental phenomenon and Krahmer and 
Stone (2010) present it as being based in a fear of regret.  The decision making 
process is distorted as agents display an aversion to alternatives that provide 
feedback irrespective of choices when compared to alternatives that provide 
feedback only of chosen paths.  
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2.3. Anticipated Regret 
 
Anticipatory not retrospective regret is key to regret theory and causes both 
risk and regret aversion.  Although regret is experienced ex post it affects decisions 
ex ante.  Supposedly (reminiscent of rational expectations) any factors that one 
considers may affect ones feelings of regret after an outcome has occurred should be 
taken account of in ones’ decisions.  Clearly, as this is a subjective process we may 
over or under estimate the impact of these factors on the regret that we actually 
experience at the outcome.  Also, because of its subjective nature it has been shown 
that inducing anticipated regret by pointing out the possibility of regretting a 
decision has been shown to be sufficient to alter decisions (e.g. Simonson 1992).  
Zeelenberg (1999) supports the aforementioned results of Larrick and Boles and also 
his own previous research that found both risk averse and risk-seeking behaviour 
could be motivated by the desire to regret minimise.  Hayashi (2008) creates a model 
where decisions makers are faced with choices that may or may not have full 
outcome resolution in order to investigate the impact of anticipated regret.  The 
model shows that choice may be affected by foregone alternatives, how discarded 
choices may impact upon remaining ones.  Anticipated regret is given as the cause of 
the endowment effect and in turn WTP/WTA disparities in Zhang and Fishbach 
(2005).  They explain disparities in WTP and WTA in terms of regret aversion where 
buyers want to minimise any regret from paying too much so may underestimate 
their true value and sellers wish to minimise regret from not asking enough and 
therefore may overshoot their true value.  They conducted three studies which all led 
them to conclude that stated prices could be manipulated by varying the 
opportunities for experiencing negative emotions (i.e. regret). 
Coricelli et al (2005) conducted a study using neuroimaging to measure brain 
activity in subjects faced with choices that could result in regret.  They found effects 
to be cumulative, regret aversion increased with repetition and also that both regret 
and its anticipation appeared to use the same parts of the brain.  This would indicate 
that people do imagine experiencing the emotion of regret during decision making. 
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2.4 The Role of Self Agency 
 
Regret theory has motivated numerous studies into factors which are likely to 
intensify the experience of regret.  One key finding has been that the emotion of 
regret appears to grow more intense the more responsibility an individual feels for 
the negative outcome.  Sugden (1985, p78-9) clarifies regret as containing two 
distinct components; the wish that you had chosen differently and self-blame for the 
action chosen.  However if the anticipation of self-recrimination is incorporated into 
decisions, Sugden no longer maintains that it is a theory of rational choice. 
This idea of the intensity of regret being a function of the amount of responsibility 
felt has been explored quite extensively and appears very robust (e.g. Fridja et al 
1989, Gilovich and Medvech, 1994).  Although Connolly et al (1997) found this was 
not supported empirically Zeelenberg et al (1998b) disagreed with this research on 
the grounds that  they had chosen to measure happiness at outcomes rather than 
regret and provides a convincing criticism and counter evidence to support a 
relationship between the two.  This can be seen to be related to omission bias as 
people are reluctant to be the instrument of the negative outcome.  Ritov and Baron 
(1995) found that a negative outcome is viewed as worse if it resulted from action 
rather than inaction.  In their decision justification theory (DJT) Connolly and 
Zeelenberg (2002) posit that the important thing is to be able to justify the choice 
made ex post.  This is again the idea of the opportunity for self-recrimination being a 
determinant of the intensity of regret that one experiences.  DJT  is not strictly 
anticipatory but if one is aware of how easy or difficult it will be to justify ones 
decision ex post and factor that in to the decision ex ante then DJT could help to 
explain behavioural violations of standard theory. 
 
2.5. Regret and Disappointment 
 
Marcatto and Ferrante (2008) created a regret and disappointment scale (RDS) with 
which to distinguish between the two emotions in an experimental setting.  Their 
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experiment compared the subjective evaluations of participants of their own 
experiences of regret and/or disappointment using direct questions with a more 
indirect series of questions aimed at uncovering their true underlying emotions.  It 
seemed participants were poor at evaluating which of the emotions they were 
experiencing.  Krahmer and Stone (2010) conclude that regret and disappointment 
may interact with each other, if this is the case, it may be a difficult task to separate 
the two in an experimental setting. 
The work by Connolly et al (1997) was thought by Zeelenberg et al (1998b) 
to have confounded the emotions of regret and disappointment and he argued further 
that measuring happiness alone told one nothing about either emotion.   
It appears there are some difficulties in distinguishing between the 
superficially similar emotions of regret and disappointment.  A neat definition of the 
two is given in Landman (1993 p47) “The child is disappointed when the tooth fairy 
forgets his third lost tooth.  The child’s parents regret the lapse.” 
Interestingly, Zeelenberg (1998a, p224) reports a study by Roseman et al 1994 which 
he summarises as concluding that “….the experience of regret involves a focus on 
the self as a cause of the event, and on possibilities for undoing the regret by 
changing the unfavourable outcome or by improving future performance.”  And he 
qualifies disappointment as giving people “…the feeling that they are not always 
able to control their own destiny, and that they perceive a lack of control.  Moreover, 
and in contrast to the experience of regret, one should feel less responsible for 
causing the event.”  So according to Zeelenberg regret is caused by feelings of 
responsibility and disappointment by outcomes failing to live up to expectations.  
Hence, according to Zeelenberg self-recrimination defines more than merely 
characterizes regret and is absent from disappointment.  Although regret relates to 
actions chosen and disappointment to states of the world both emotions are 
experienced through counterfactual thought; imagining what might have been 
(Zeelenberg et al 1998c).  Fridja et al (1989) also find that self-blame is more likely 
to cause regret than disappointment.   
 
2.6 Feedback-Conditional Regret (FCR) 
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The original regret theory did not specifically test for the impact of feedback 
either on decision- making or on the depth of regret.  Rather, feedback was given on 
both choices selected and those forgone.  Work exploring feedback conditional 
regret studies the influence that varying feedback conditions may have upon decision 
making.   
Although it is arguable that feedback is something of a necessary condition 
for the experience of regret, imagined outcomes also can play a role (e.g. Sugden 
1985, Kahneman and Miller 1986).  It is certainly considered by Kahneman (1995 
p392) who asks readers to imagine a decision-maker facing two gambles; 
“Both gambles will be played out but the decision maker will know only the 
outcome of the gamble chosen.  Will the effects of regret vanish completely?  The 
answer to this question is not yet known, but I suspect that it will be negative….An 
intriguing possibility is that the evaluation of options is not constrained by what the 
decision maker expects to be knowable.  Thus, options may be avoided because their 
outcomes are likely to be regrettable even if they are not in fact likely to be 
regretted.”  
However this is typically assumed (e.g. by Zeelenberg 1996) to be a much less 
important factor in the decision process than real feedback.  Larrick (1993 p446) 
makes the distinction; 
“Feedback about what definitely would have occurred produces a greater potential 
for regret than pallid, abstract knowledge of what was statistically likely to occur” 
Faced with a pairwise choice problem, subjects who choose one option may or may 
not discover whether they would have been better off had they chosen another 
option.  A subject who chooses a certain £10 over a 10% chance of £100 who knows 
he will not discover what would have happened had he chosen the gamble would be 
protected against any regret.  If he knows that the gamble will be played out 
whatever option he chooses, he must weigh up the potential regret of foregoing the 
certainty and losing the gamble against taking the certainty and discovering that he 
would have won the £100 in the gamble.  Because of this asymmetry of feedback 
Zeelenberg et al (1996) looked at the impact of feedback on regret in risky choices 
where not only the certainty option was resolved but the risky option would be 
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played out too.  They hypothesized that people are regret rather than risk averse and 
found that regret can affect risk behaviour, causing either apparently risk seeking or 
risk averse behaviour depending on the option that minimises potential regret.  They 
manipulated feedback so that in some treatments feedback was given on the safe 
option and in others it was given on the risky option.  They found that people tended 
to select the option on which there would be feedback.   
Humphrey (2004, p845-6) extends original regret theory to more explicitly 
state the importance of foregone act resolution thus formalising Zeelenberg’s view of 
its importance.  The typical layout of a pairwise choice experiment using lottery 
tickets and an act/event matrix display might be something like that shown below. 
 
 
            A 
1-30 31-80 81-100 
£20 £10 £0 
30% 50% 20% 
 
            B 
 
1-45 46-70 71-100 
£20 £10 £0 
45% 25% 30% 
 
In choice A if any of numbers 1-30 are drawn one would receive £20; £10 for 
numbers  31-80  and £0 for numbers 81-100.  So if one chooses A and number 35 is  
drawn one can regret not choosing B and if 75 is drawn one can rejoice at not  
choosing B.  It can be seen that this design resolves both the chosen and not chosen 
paths because the matrix provides full feedback.  The subject finds out the number of 
his lottery ticket, and so knows which state has occurred.   
By contrast, in Humphrey’s Matrix Example (table 1) with the subject choosing 
between the $ an the P bet, the subject finds out only his payoff and has to try to 
infer the state of the world from this. 
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Acts in a standard triple 
Act                                                    Probability of state of the world 
                        p1 (blue)                     p2 (yellow)                        p3 (green)                  p4(red) 
$                         a                                a                                          d                                  d 
P                         b                                e                                          b                                  e 
C                         c                                c                                          c                                   c 
Where a > b > c > d ≥ e and are money consequences 
Source: Humphrey, S. (2004). ‘Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory and Testing Regret Aversion in Risky Choice’, 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 25, p843 
 
If p1 + p3 > 1/2 > p1 + p4 then P becomes the P bet and $ the $ bet as defined in the 
preference reversal phenomenon
6
.  
Here, the outcome of one’s decision does not reveal which state of the world 
occurred and could leave a slightly ambiguous emotional reaction.  For example with 
the choice of act $ over P resulting in the occurrence of outcome d, does one regret 
at foregoing b under the green state of the world or rejoice at foregoing e in the red 
state of the world? 
Because of the ambiguity, in his feedback conditional regret theory Humphrey adds 
the following restrictions to those of original regret theory.  : In Humphrey’s theory, 
there are two different modified utility functions, m(x, y) and (x, y), where m(x, y) 
is the modified anticipated utility of having x and foregoing y when outcome x fully 
reveals which state of the world occurred and (x, y) is the modified anticipated 
utility of having x and foregoing y when outcome x does not fully reveal which state 
of the world occurred. 
 
                                                             
6 This preference reversal phenomenon as described by Grether and Plott (1979) is clearly illustrated 
by the classic example of the P bet and $bet.  The P bet describes a gamble with a decent chance of 
winning a modest prize and the $ bet a smaller chance of a more substantial prize.  It has been 
shown that there is a tendency for subjects to choose the P bet over the $ bet in a straight choice 
but to place a higher monetary value upon the $ bet than the P bet.  
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4) For all yx,  such that ),(),(: yxyxmyx   
 
When outcome x fully reveals the state of the world then the rejoicing upon 
receiving x and not y will be greater than if x did not fully reveal the state of the 
world. 
 
5) For all yx,  such that ),(),(: xyxymyx    
 
Regret will be lessened when y is attained and y does not fully reveal the state of the 
world. 
6) For all yx,  such that ),(),(),(),(: yxyxmxymxyyx     
 
The impact of foregone act resolution upon regret is greater than upon rejoicing. 
This follows from the observations of e.g. Larrick and Boles (1995). 
 
Implicit in this revision of regret theory is the assertion that previous research 
may have overstated the certainty effect.  Regret aversion causes a bias towards the 
certainty in choices where the choosing of the safer option does not lead to the 
revealing of outcomes of riskier options.  Thus a requirement for foregone act 
resolution in all choices would help to end the confounding of risk and regret 
aversion as identified in Zeelenberg (1999). 
 
If FCR impacts upon decisions ex ante then it could well be expected to 
manifest itself in a reluctance to place oneself in a situation such as having swapped 
a lottery ticket for another, or to have sold a lottery ticket with a potentially high 
113 
 
pay-out for a small cash sum if the lottery is then to be played out with one’s original 
ticket included in the draw.  Thus, by not selling or swapping one’s original ticket, 
one is protected from the experience of FCR as one would not have known which 
ticket one would have received in exchange, or could only regret the loss of a small 
sum of money in the case of passing up the opportunity to sell one’s ticket. 
 
3. Control and the Illusion of Control (IOC) 
 
Perception of control is said to be important for psychological well-being.  
One’s ‘locus of control’ is defined as internal if one feels that events are a result of 
one’s own actions and external if one feels that events are in the control of some 
external force such as luck (Marsh & Weary, 1995).  Marsh and Weary concluded 
that an internal locus of control increases a person’s expectation of success following 
success and decreases them following failure and an external locus decreases ones 
expectation of success following success and increased expectations following 
failure.  Seligman (1975) defines an event as controllable when a person’s voluntary 
responses have an impact on the consequences of that event and uncontrollable when 
no voluntary response has an impact on the event.  He concludes that a consequence 
of feeling out of control is inaction.  Control is also the central theme of Bandura’s 
(1977) self-efficacy theory which concerns how individuals’ expectations impact 
upon the goals they set for themselves.   If they believe they have control over events 
sufficient to allow them to achieve something they will strive to do so e.g. passing a 
test. 
There can be a tendency for this perception of control to become illusory 
when the belief in one’s abilities to control outcomes is unfounded.  Ellen Langer 
(1975) ran a series of psychological experiments to highlight a behavioural 
phenomenon which she labelled the ‘illusion of control’ (IOC).  Defined by Langer 
(1975 p311) as “an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately 
higher than the objective probability would warrant”, this effect was clearly 
illustrated in one experiment where it was shown that people placed a significantly 
higher value on a lottery ticket which they had selected themselves than on one 
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which they were allocated (on average there was a four-fold difference).  This 
involvement effect was also found by others (Wortman 1975, Benassi et al 1981).  
The behaviour was found to be amplified by skill cues such as this involvement but 
also familiarity, choice and competition.  
There has been some debate in the psychological literature as to whether the 
Illusion of Control is the most appropriate label for the phenomenon.  An extensive 
meta-analytic review of experiments investigating the illusion of control was carried 
out by Presson and Benassi (1996) and they concluded that across all 53 experiments 
included in their study there was a strong illusion of control effect but they question 
whether the illusion is of control or judgement.  As posited by Koehler et al (1994) it 
may be that individuals overrate their chances of success without actually believing 
they control the outcome.  They found that the illusion of control could be shattered 
by repetition when multi-shot experiments were reported to quash the IOC by 
Koehler et al and Bersabe and Arias (2000).  Although Langer herself found that in a 
repeated coin toss game, IOC increased rather than diminished if subjects were doing 
well (Langer and Roth 1975).  In psychological investigation it has been found that 
IOC can be adaptive; depressives are less likely to exhibit a tendency towards IOC, 
showing it to be a kind of (albeit unrealistic) positive thinking which can be a 
positive attribute (Taylor and Brown 1988).  However IOC has been used to explain 
some behaviour seen in financial markets where it is shown to be maladaptive. 
Fenton-O’Creevey et al (2003) found that financial markets provided fertile ground 
for IOC and that trader performance was inversely related to their propensity for it. 
There has also been identified on trading floors a tendency towards overconfidence 
or, further, even ‘magical thinking’.  Magical thinking is a phenomenon where 
people believe they have power to influence an outcome when they do not, a 
behaviour that has even been observed amongst pigeons
7
.  Quasi-magical thinking, 
as defined by Shafir and Tversky (1992), describes situations in which people act as 
if they believe that their actions can influence an outcome (as with magical thinking) 
                                                             
7
 In a classic experiment Skinner (1948) fed hungry pigeons small quantities of food at regular 
intervals with no dependence whatsoever on the bird's behaviour. Even though the feeding was not 
related to their behaviour, the birds began to behave as if they had a "superstition" that something they 
were doing was causing the feeding. Each pigeon apparently conditioned itself to perform a certain 
action to get the food such as turning around or head-tossing.  
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but in which they in fact do not truly believe this. Quasi-magical thinking appears to 
manifest more strongly in predicting outcomes of future, rather than reflecting on 
past events. By Langer’s definition, it would appear that what differentiates the IOC 
from magical thinking is that it specifically relates to a belief in an increased 
probability of success not only in a belief in the ability to control outcomes.  Hence it 
appears that magical thinking is a broader term and the Illusion of control may 
perhaps be a particular form of it.  More recently Koszegi (2006) modelled ‘ego 
utility’ where an individual derives satisfaction from believing he is good at a 
particular task or activity and may overrate his skills as a result. 
Langer’s IOC is of interest to those studying the behaviour of gamblers.  It 
has been shown repeatedly that skill is falsely attributed to chance situations.  A 
clear example given by Langer (1975) is in casinos where it has been observed that 
craps players throw the die harder in the hope of generating higher numbers.  Sports 
locker rooms are known to be bursting with superstitious behaviour as players go 
through their pre-match rituals in an attempt to influence the outcome of a game.  
This is also repeated behaviour; in fact it probably increases over time if it appears to 
work (like the coin toss in Langer [1975]) where if one wins it will be attributed to 
the correct ritual being followed but if something goes wrong, it will be questioned 
whether it was because something was done differently this time.  It is not that their 
actions do not affect the outcome (i.e. running faster) it is merely that there is no 
direct causality between say, putting one’s left shoe on first and winning a race. 
Langer and Roth (1975) found that people place larger bets before a coin is tossed 
than after (where the outcome has been concealed), as if they think that they can 
influence the outcome of the toss.  I would question whether if people are willing to 
bet more on an untossed coin than on one that has been tossed but the outcome not 
revealed this is truly indicative of IOC.  Do people believe they have an increased 
chance or does the greater excitement offered by the untossed coin induce higher 
bets (especially if the toss were to be watched)?  
Goodman and Irwin (2006) investigated preferences for certain numbers 
generated by familiar systems such as dates or names and found them to exist along 
with preferences for systems such as horoscopes that, whilst not necessarily being 
believed in, create enjoyment and are therefore preferred over systems without such 
positive associations.  Interestingly they feel that anticipated regret can be modified 
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by this enjoyment or a belief in fate (lack of control) as if subject’s enjoyment of 
participating in the task makes up for any potential loss 
The illusion of control and/or magical thinking operate on decision making 
ex ante but it is worth noting that there is a kind of illusory behaviour often 
displayed ex post.  A fairly robust psychological finding is that individuals strive to 
avoid cognitive dissonance (conflicting thoughts) and will therefore tend to justify 
present and past decisions even in the face of evidence that the decision was wrong.  
The well-known psychological state of ‘denial’ is a prime example of this cognitive 
dissonance.  
Goetzmann and Peles (1993) have offered this as an explanation as to why 
investors in losing funds are unwilling to confront the evidence that they made a bad 
investment by selling their investments. Zeelenberg (1999) compares post decisional 
dissonance with anticipated regret and whilst the line between the two is not sharply 
defined, he identifies the difference as lying in regret pertaining to the comparison of 
what is and what might have been and post decisional dissonance being able to arise 
merely out of what is.  The aforementioned model by Hayashi (2008) shows how a 
decision maker may choose differently between choices that remain once some have 
been discarded than they would have done when all the choices were still on the 
table.  In a similar vein to cognitive dissonance and offering one explanation for 
status quo bias is self-perception theory  (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988)  This is 
the notion that, having made a decision  (and therefore revealed ones preference to 
oneself where preferences are uncertain) one is more likely to adhere to that choice 
in the future thereby maintaining the status quo. 
As this work is built upon psychological rather than economic foundations, 
its relevance to economics may not be immediately apparent but there are clear 
implications for theories of rational choice in economics.  For example if, as found 
by Langer, the value one places on something is dramatically increased by the fact 
that one has engaged in some cognitive process in order to select it, this presents a 
challenge to the traditional definition of rational economic behaviour.   
If an individual’s expectation as to the chance of winning in a lottery can be 
manipulated by altering the level of involvement he feels in the process that has led 
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to his endowment with a particular ticket, then this could help to explain the 
reluctance to exchange or sell a ticket.  An overinflated belief in the ticket’s chance 
of success could be brought about by allowing subjects in an experiment to select 
their own ticket or perhaps more so by engaging them in a task in order to determine 
which ticket they will receive.  If Langer is correct, the more involved subjects feel 
in the ticket selection process, the less willing they ought to be to subsequently part 
with the ticket.  
4. Loss Aversion,  Endowment effects and WTA/WTP 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) describes how individuals 
evaluate losses and gains starting from a reference point.  The central assumption of 
the theory is that people are loss averse; more specifically, that losses are felt more 
keenly than gains. Prospect theory allows for people’s expected utility to be 
dependent on the way in which they frame the choices they face in their minds.  This 
is because prospect theory replaced the utility function of EUT with a value function 
that is concave for gains and convex for losses.  This means that the value function 
in prospect theory differs from the utility function in expected utility theory in a very 
important respect; it has a kink in it at the "reference point", the location of which is 
determined subjectively by the individual.  The important feature of prospect theory 
here is the inclusion of a probability weighting function that means individuals tend 
to over-weight outcomes with very low probabilities. Attitudes towards risk and 
(pertinently) activities such as the purchase of lottery tickets can be explained by 
this.  The chances of winning something like a national lottery with a minute 
probability of winning, if framed by advertisers and by consumers themselves as 
merely improbable, will be overestimated according to the theory and would explain 
why people pay in excess of the lottery’s expected value for a ticket. 
The assumption of rationality in economic theory traditionally means that 
people hold a fixed and known value for all goods and this is inalterable by framing 
or other such psychological effects.  Endowment effects have often been held 
responsible for violations of rationality in the choices people make.  An endowment 
effect is said to exist if people are more unwilling to part with, or place a higher 
value upon, a good that forms part of their endowment than one that does not.  
According to prospect theory, this is said to be because they view the loss of a good 
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from an endowment as more painful than a foregone gain (which therefore attracts a 
lesser value).  Extensive research has been devoted to the unravelling of this robust 
finding (e.g., Knetsch 1989, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990) and explanations 
have included Status quo bias (e.g. Samuelson and ZeckHauser 1988), where people 
are simply reluctant to alter their current position, or the closely related omission 
bias (e.g. Ritov and Baron, 1992, 1995) where, because it is easier (less costly) not to 
act than to act, people are more likely to stick with what they have.   
Related to endowment effects is the willingness to pay, willingness to accept 
(WTP/WTA) disparity that has attracted a lot of interest from experimental 
economists (e.g. Knetsch and Sinden 1984, Coursey, Hovis and Schulze 1987).  This 
is the phenomenon that when asked to place a value on a good (in many cases a 
public good) there is a strong tendency for people to place a higher value on a good 
when asked what they would be willing to accept in order to forego it than when 
asked what they would be willing to pay for the same good.  Endowment effects and 
status-quo bias are amongst explanations given for this violation of EUT theory. 
The reluctance to part with lottery tickets could perhaps be attributed to a simple 
endowment effect; because they view a ticket they are given as ‘theirs’ people form 
some sort of attachment to it and view their ticket differently to even an apparently 
identical one.  
It could be that when asked what they would be willing to accept in order to part 
with a lottery ticket for a sum of cash, that participants in experiments have a 
tendency to value the ticket more highly than if they were asked what they would be 
willing to pay for one.  This is not so much a possible explanation of the reluctance 
to swap or sell a ticket as a 
Loss aversion may underlie endowment effects and the WTA/WTP disparity.  If  the 
potential loss felt if one were to exchange or sell a winning ticket (the prize forgone) 
is viewed as greater in magnitude than the commensurate gain would be if one 
exchanged or sold an won, then loss aversion might explain the observed reluctance  
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5. Motivation for the Experiment – three papers 
 
The experiment reported in this chapter has been partially motivated by three 
papers in particular, the relevant parts of which I will summarise as a background to 
its design. 
‘The Illusion of Control’ – Ellen Langer 1975 
Ellen Langer conducted several experiments in order to identify factors 
which may induce the illusion of control.  The most germane here being her choice 
experiments where a purchased lottery ticket was either given to or chosen by office 
workers before they were given the option (on a pretext) of selling it back.  The 
tickets took the form of football cards, one of which was selected by participants in 
the choice condition with an identical card then allocated to a participant in the no 
choice condition. The mean selling price in the choice condition was $8.67 and $1.96 
in the no choice for a $1 lottery ticket. 
In the same paper Langer investigated the role of familiarity.  She compared 
preferences between lottery tickets bearing letters with those bearing unfamiliar 
esoteric symbols.  It was found that the reluctance to swap was significantly stronger 
in the treatment with familiar letters than with the unfamiliar symbols which Langer 
concluded was attributable to the illusion of control. 
She found that passive involvement was a factor in increased illusion of 
control.  The illusion of an increased probability of success in a chance task could be 
induced by increased time spent dwelling on it.  Langer ran a field experiment at a 
racetrack where the entrance fee paid to attend a race evening entitled race-goers to 
entry in a lottery.  During the course of the evening, at various points in time, race-
goers were asked to rate their confidence in their chance of winning the lottery. This 
was found to increase significantly as the evening wore on.  In a subsequent 
experiment, this result was retested using a lottery amongst office workers divided 
into high and low involvement conditions.  Participants in both conditions were 
given a three digit number as their entry into the lottery.  In the high involvement 
condition this number was given out one digit at a time over three days and in the 
low involvement condition it was given in one go.  Reluctance to exchange their 
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entry in the original lottery for entry into one with better odds was significantly 
greater in the group that had been given their number over three days.  She also 
found a sense of competition and also response familiarity increased IOC.  The 
central finding was that a purely chance task that mimics a skill task will induce the 
same behaviours in participants as if they truly had some control over the outcome. 
Fong and McCabe (1999) were critical of Langer’s use of football cards and 
other lotteries which allowed subjects to choose numbered tickets.  In such studies it 
is hard to separate those who place a higher value on their ticket because it 
represents their favourite football player or lucky number from those who value it 
more highly because of their involvement in its selection.  In either case it is difficult 
to know whether this involvement really translates into a higher subjective 
probability of winning or not.  Is there just an issue of attachment rather than 
control?  A preference for certain players, familiar symbols over unfamiliar ones 
does not necessarily equate to inflated belief in chances of success.  Only the 
racetrack experiment asked about confidence in winning and it is hard to believe that 
in this field study, other factors (such as alcohol consumption or the early departure 
of those who had lost the most, leaving only the more confident winners) as the 
evening wore on were being controlled for. 
 
‘Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets?’ – Maya Bar-Hilell and 
Efrat Neter 1996 
Bar-Hilell and Neter (1996) ran a series of experiments to investigate 
people’s reluctance to part with lottery tickets.  Building on previous research (e.g. 
Knetsch and Sinden 1984) which showed a reluctance to exchange tickets for a 
lottery for cash they aimed to compare attitudes towards exchanging lottery tickets 
for other tickets with those of exchanging pens for pens.  They found that people 
were indeed reluctant to exchange their ticket for another (plus a small incentive) but 
displayed no such reluctance when endowed with a pen and offered the chance to 
exchange it for another pen plus the same small incentive.  They conclude that loss 
aversion could explain this state of affairs.  If one gives up a ticket for another and 
one’s original ticket goes on to win this is viewed as a loss, more so than a ticket 
exchanged for a winning one would be viewed as a gain.  
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Illusion of control was investigated in their first experiment where lottery 
tickets were distributed and subjects wrote their names on them before answering a 
series of questions.  Were they willing to exchange for another ticket plus a sweet? 
Did they feel the ticket they held had a higher, equal or lower chance of winning 
than any other? Why were they willing or unwilling to exchange?  They found little 
evidence of the illusion of control, people did not appear to believe that their tickets 
had a greater chance of winning, though a variety of reasons (fate, lucky numbers)  
were put forward to explain the reluctance to swap tickets.  The effect of regret on 
the willingness to exchange was tested in a further two experiments.  Lotteries were 
conducted where, in different treatments, participants either discovered the 
consequences of exchanging their ticket or did not and this outcome resolution was 
either public or private.  In non-resolution treatments, exchanged tickets were 
removed from the draw altogether and replaced with others so no resolution was 
possible but the probability of winning remained the same.  To their surprise, the 
authors found that uncertainty resolution had little impact on exchange decisions and 
that having the outcome of participants’ decisions made public actually increased the 
numbers who were willing to exchange.  They concluded that the anticipated regret 
of not winning when one has exchanged a ticket that could have been the winning 
one is the most feasible motivation for exchange reluctance which is unaffected by 
uncertainty resolution and therefore the imagined outcome is as strong a force as the 
real one.  They found no effects from framing or the writing of a subjects name on a 
ticket.  
A central question arising from their findings is what it is about the nature of 
lottery tickets that makes them be viewed so differently from pens.  Bar-Hilell and 
Neter believe it is the potential ex post differences between lottery tickets that 
distinguish them from pens.  Although lottery tickets represent identical gambles 
they may represent very different states of the world (if you exchange a pen for a 
pen, you get a pen).  It is this difference that allows the mechanism of anticipated 
regret to affect the decision to exchange.  As in the aforementioned studies, regret at 
an action taken can be expected to be greater than that caused by inaction. 
It is worth the additional mention here of an experiment run by Ven and 
Zeelenberg (2011) which extended the Bar-Hilell and Neter study to specifically test 
for the effect of anticipated regret.  Lottery tickets offered to participants in some 
122 
 
treatments were in sealed envelopes and participants were shown to be significantly 
more willing to exchange these tickets than those not in envelopes. The tickets that 
they could never know the numbers were exchanged more readily as participants 
were protected from the regret of finding out they went on to win having been 
exchanged. 
Testing for Feedback-Conditional Regret Effects Using a Natural Lottery - Steven J 
Humphrey, Paul Mann and Chris Starmer 2005 
Humphrey et al conducted an experiment specifically to test for the effect of 
feedback conditional regret on the decision to exchange a lottery ticket for cash.  
They used national lottery scratch cards as the medium.  In this simple, one shot 
experiment subjects were allocated a scratch card and then offered the opportunity to 
sell it back to the experimenter (for up to £1.50).  In one treatment they were to find 
out the outcome if the card was sold and in another they were not.  As expected, the 
opportunity for regret in former caused a greater reluctance to part with the ticket 
and elicited a higher price than in the latter treatment.  The difference between the 
two treatments was strongly significant; at the top offer price of £1.50 41.4% of 
subjects in the regret treatment and 16% in the no regret treatment chose to keep the 
card.  If this is a replicable result, it would appear that the regret premium measured 
by Larrick and Boles at 10% could be something of an underestimate.  
 
6. The Experiment 
 
6.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment reported here uses lottery scratch cards in a similar manner to 
that of Humphrey et al, but with additional treatments designed to isolate IOC 
effects.  It investigates the impact of feedback-conditional regret on decisions in a 
similar way to their scratch card experiment, but includes two treatments designed to 
consider the impact of the illusion of control on the same decision. There are two 
treatments with full resolution and two with resolution of the gamble, only if it is 
chosen.   
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I wished to extend the scope of the Humphrey et al experiment to include the 
opportunity to distinguish between the illusion of control and FCR as reasons for 
reluctance to exchange a lottery ticket for cash.  Although I prefer the medium of a 
national lottery scratch card to do this, I also aim to reproduce the elicitation of the 
illusion of control and anticipated regret in the Bar-Hilell paper, albeit in a different 
fashion.  
The illusion of control was induced by asking subjects to choose their own 
scratch card from one of four sealed coloured envelopes.  The aim of this was to 
maintain the required feeling of involvement whilst avoiding the potential confusion 
of preferences for lucky numbers (as the in Bar-Hilell and Neter experiments) or 
objects that subjects may have strong feelings about (such as football cards in 
Langer) so subjects should feel similarly involved to each other in the choice.   
Whilst some of the intensity of the illusion of control displayed by say, a football fan 
in Langer’s experiment may be lost, the use of coloured envelopes should equalise 
the strength of preferences across subjects.  There is a little more time spent thinking 
about the task in these treatments which will only increase the feelings of 
involvement over the non-envelope treatments.   
The opportunity to experience FCR was also required in two of the 
treatments.  Subjects were divided in to two groups of ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ (though 
the more neutral terms of  ‘cashholders’ and ‘cardholders’ were used during the 
experiment) where buyers were given an amount of cash  with which to bid for a 
scratch card in one auction and sellers were given a card and asked to select a 
minimum cash amount that they would sell it for in a separate auction.  The central 
purpose of this dual auction design was to make the potential feedback conditional 
regret in some treatments more salient as the seller of the card in the regret 
treatments (i.e. the person willing to accept the least cash for his card) would be 
asked to cross the room and physically give the winner his scratch card as well as 
witnessing the card being scratched.  Any winnings would obviously belong to the 
buyer of the card.   
The fact that scratch cards are a familiar commodity to most subjects (this 
was verified in the experiment) gives an opportunity for the experience of the 
illusion of control in the envelope choice treatments and perhaps their use renders 
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the experiment less of an artificial task than some and improves its external validity.  
For clarity, verbal instructions were also given.   
The experiment takes the form of a between subject, 2 X 2 factorial design 
and the treatments are as follows; 
 
Treatment 1 -  Neither IOC nor FCR 
Subjects in the sellers group were given a scratch card at random and offered the 
chance to sell it (for a price between 10p and £5).  They were asked to complete a 
table of incremental amounts, ticking all of those that they would be willing to 
accept for their card.   They were instructed that they needed to be consistent e.g they 
could not indicate that they would accept £1 and £2 but refuse an amount between 
the two.  An auction was then conducted to determine the seller. The participant in 
the sellers’ group asking for the lowest amount sold their card, receiving the second 
lowest asking price for it to ensure incentive compatibility.   
Buyers bid in a separate auction for a different scratch card from a different bag.  
Subjects in the buyers’ group were given £3 in cash and asked to state (by means of 
ticking boxes next to incremental amounts from 10p up to £3) how much of that £3 
they would be willing to pay for a scratch card.  Again, consistency was required so 
a subject who was willing to pay one amount for a card, also had to indicate that they 
would also pay amounts below their maximum bid.  In the buyers auction, the person 
offering the highest amount received the card (for the second highest bid price). In 
the event of a tie, the tied sellers’ or buyers’ participant numbers were put into bag 
and the auction winner drawn at random.   
The seller of the scratch card did not find out if it was a winning card, the sold card 
was returned to a bag of scratch cards and buyers who won their auction were not 
required to scratch the card publicly.  
In this treatment sellers of scratch cards are protected from feedback conditional 
regret as there is no revelation of the outcome of the path forgone i.e. whether the 
scratch card they sold was a winning one or not will never be known to them. 
125 
 
The involvement felt in the process of card selection was kept to a minimum.  The 
cards were given out quickly and randomly, so there was no reason to expect 
subjects in this treatment to feel that they may have had any particular control over 
the chance of winning from their scratch card.  The design of this treatment shouldn't 
induce either IOC or FCR and is therefore the baseline.  
Treatment 2 - IOC Only 
This treatment was conducted in the same way as treatment 1 except for the 
procedure of allocating cards to sellers.  Subjects in the sellers’ group selected their 
own scratch card by choosing between four coloured envelopes, each containing a 
scratch card and were then offered the chance to sell it as in treatment 1.   
Subjects were required to write down which colour envelope that had selected to 
make their choice as a means of adding more significance to their choice.  This was 
to increase their feeling of involvement in the process of deciding which scratch card 
they would own.  Participants in IOC  treatments were not given their main 
instructions until after they had selected the card as there was the possibility of the 
first choice contaminating the second by some process such as the disjunction effect 
(e.g.Tversky and Shafir 1992)
8
.  This treatment should invoke illusion of control yet 
give no opportunity to experience FCR. 
 
Treatment 3 - FCR Only 
                                                             
8
 The disjunction effect was described by Tversky and Shafir (1992) who asked subjects whether they 
would accept the following gamble: on the toss of a coin either a $200 win or a $100 loss.  Those who 
accepted were asked whether they would play another round of the gamble, some were asked before 
the initial gamble was played out and some afterwards.  They found that those who were asked after 
the first toss were more much likely to accept the second toss whether they had won or lost. If one's 
decision is the same regardless of the outcome of the first bet, then it would seem that one would 
make the same decision before knowing the outcome.  Tversky and Shafir explained this by the 
winners of the first toss having nothing to lose, the losers wishing to recoup their losses and those 
who were asked before the first toss not having a clear enough reason to agree to a second gamble.  In 
the experiment reported in this dissertation [chapter] the decision as to whether one would sell the 
card could be coloured by the fact that subjects were being asked to choose an envelope at the same 
time. 
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This treatment operated in the same way as treatment 1 except that when a seller sold 
his card, he was asked to cross the room to give it to the winner of the buyers’ 
auction who then scratched it off publically.  Rather than having a separate bag of 
cards for buyers and sellers, the winning buyer would actually receive the card 
belonging to a seller.  This provided a clear opportunity for sellers to experience 
feedback conditional regret if the card he sold went on to win a prize. 
 
Treatment 4 - IOC and FCR 
This treatment combined the envelope selection process with the public revelation of 
the scratch card.  This gives the opportunity to experience FCR as in treatment 3 and 
IOC as in treatment 2. 
 
Unlike Humphrey et al, I opted to use the lottery scratch card with the highest 
top prize of £100,000 as opposed to the £1,000 in their experiment as it seemed this 
could only magnify any feelings of regret or control. The expected value of this type 
of scratch card is a little over 59 pence (see appendix 2 for calculations) although 
subjects were not informed of this or of the odds of winning each prize.  They were 
merely given the overall odds of winning a prize as 1 in 4.9, rendering the choice 
more one of uncertainty than risk.  They were also informed that the prizes ranged 
from £1 to £100,000 and the cards retail for £1. 
The maximum amount offered to purchase the scratch cards was increased to 
£5.00 in this experiment rather than the £1.50 maximum offer in Humphrey et al.  
This was done with the aim of increasing the range of data.    There were 8 sellers 
and 4 buyers in each session.  
The experiment was run in a fairly open way; though decisions and outcomes 
were kept private, there was no specific requirement for silence.  This allowed 
subjects’ instinctive reactions to the choices to both increase the saliency of regret 
and not to stifle any competitive feelings which could enhance the illusion of control. 
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Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 – Illusion of Control 
 
If Illusion of control is a factor in reluctance to part with lottery tickets, then 
treatment 2 will produce higher requested selling prices than treatment 1.  If 
participants have a higher WTA in treatments where they are asked to select a 
scratch card from a coloured envelope than when the cards are randomly distributed 
without envelopes, this will be taken as evidence of illusion of control. If an effect 
exists, in treatment 2, it will be isolated from any FCR effects that may be present in 
treatments 3 and 4 
Additionally comparing participants stated WTA values in with no IOC treatments 
(i.e. 1 and 3 with 2 and 4) will test for the influence of illusion of control. 
Hypothesis 2 – Feedback Conditional Regret 
In treatment 1 there is no feedback from the gamble (no foregone act resolution). If 
FCR plays a role in reluctance to sell, then treatment 3 should produce higher WTA 
values than treatment 1.  If  knowing that they will witness another participant 
scratching your card and keeping any winnings from it if you sell it makes 
participants more reluctant to sell, the WTA values in treatment 3 will be higher than 
in treatment 1.  In treatment 3, this effect will be isolated from any IOC effects in 
treatments 2 and 4. 
Comparing regret with no regret treatments (i.e. 1 and 2 with 3 and 4) will 
test for the presence of FCR effects. 
Hypothesis 3 – Interaction Effects 
There is a possibility that the combination of FCR and IOC produce a higher WTA 
than either effect in isolation.  If regret and Illusion of control can work together or 
compound each other then there may be a stronger effect on WTA values than when 
IOC or FCR effects are produced in isolation.  If this is the case, then treatment 4 
will produce higher WTA values than both treatment 2 and treatment 3.  The null 
hypothesis is therefore that there will not be a significant difference between stated 
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WTA values in treatment 4 when compared with both treatment 2 and treatment 3.  
The alternative hypothesis is that the interaction of FCR and IOC produces an effect 
that is greater than either IOC or FCR produces alone, causing significantly higher 
bids between treatment 4 and both treatments 2 and 3. 
 
A comparison between sellers’ WTAs in treatments 1 and 2 gives a measure 
of the size of the influence of IOC on reluctance to sell and a comparison between 
treatments 1 and 3, a measure of the influence of FCR.  The respective strength of 
the influence of IOC and FCR can then be compared by analysing asking prices in 
treatments 2 and 3.   
 
6.2 Experimental Procedure 
 
288 subjects were recruited by email and by direct approach on campus.  The 
subject pool was a mixture of UEA students from a wide range of disciplines (both 
undergraduates and postgraduates) and some members of staff.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to treatments and 24 sessions were conducted in total (6 of each 
treatment). 
Subjects were randomly assigned to numbered desks upon arrival and given 
written instructions according to the treatment and according to their role of buyer or 
seller (see appendix). Subjects in all treatments were asked to complete a consent 
form.  There was no attempt to control for differing risk attitudes amongst subjects; 
participants are simply representative of the distribution of risk attitudes in the 
general population.   
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7. Results and Analysis 
The raw data were transformed to generate, for each subject and each 
treatment, a stated valuation.  Where applicable, this was the mean of the most 
favourable price (i.e. highest selling price or lowest buying price) that the subject 
had rejected and the least favourable price (i.e. lowest selling price or highest buying 
price) that the subject had accepted.  For example, a subject who stated that they 
would pay £1 for a scratch card but not £1.10 would have their valuation recorded as 
£1.05.  Similarly, a seller stating they would accept 50p for their card but not 40p 
would have their valuation recorded as 45p.  The data on sellers’ valuations are 
truncated because the highest selling price that subjects were asked to consider was 
£5 and the highest buying price that subjects were asked to consider was £3.  For 
subjects who report that they would not sell at £5, stated valuation is defined as 
£5.05.  For subjects who report that they would buy at £3, stated valuation is defined 
as £3.05.  These definitions have only a small effect on mean stated valuations and 
no effect at all on medians, since no buyers and only a very small proportion of 
sellers fell into these categories. 
In Table 1 below are the mean and median stated valuations of scratch cards 
by treatment.  The buyers’ WTP values are given, but they are somewhat redundant 
as there was no attempt to control conditions in the buyer’s task so as to enable a 
meaningful WTA/WTP comparison to be made nor to enable the measurement of 
any effects via FCR or IOC. 
 
Treatment Mean 
Sellers’ 
SV 
Mean 
Buyers’ 
SV 
Median 
Sellers’ 
SV 
Median 
Buyers’ 
SV 
Std Dev 
Sellers 
Std Dv 
Buyers 
1 1.54 1.49 1.4 1.55 .87 .60 
2 1.86 1.41 1.9 1.15 .81 .71 
3 2.49 1.38 2.45 1.05 1.18 .75 
4 2.34 1.27 2.45 1.05 1.13 .63 
All 2.06 1.39 1.95 1.05 1.07 0.67 
Table 1: Mean and median stated valuation (SV) by treatment 
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Cumulative frequencies of reported valuation in each treatment are shown in 
Figure 1. 
The bottom axis in each graph represents amounts up to £5 (fig.1) .For each amount 
of money, the graph shows the percentage of subjects whose reported valuation was 
less than that amount. 
Fig.1 Cumulative frequency of reported valuation by treatment:WTA 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 - Illusion of control 
If the illusion of control was a factor in sellers’ decisions, treatment 2 (IOC only) 
would be expected to have induced higher stated valuations from sellers than 
treatment 1 (the baseline treatment). The null hypothesis is that selecting a card from 
a choice of coloured envelopes makes no difference to what participants are willing 
to accept for the card and there is no difference between WTA in this treatment and 
the baseline treatment.  The alternative hypothesis is that there is an illusion of 
control affect and WTA values are higher in treatment 3 than treatment . 
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Additionally an IOC effect will be shown if the two IOC treatments (2 and 4) give 
rise to higher WTA values than treatments (1 and 3) where no envelopes are used. 
 
Table 1 shows some evidence of an IOC effect in that mean and median asking 
prices are higher in treatment 2 than in 1.  Mean asking prices were 1.54 in treatment 
1 and 1.86 in treatment 2; median prices were 1.4 and 1.9.    
The same effect appears in the cumulative frequency data.  In figure 1, sellers’ stated 
valuations are higher in treatment 1 than 2.  However, this effect does not appear to 
hold when treatments 3 and 4 are compared.  Means are very close (2.49 in treatment 
3 and 2.34 in treatment 4) and medians are identical at 2.45.  This is confirmed by 
very similar cumulative frequency plots of the two treatments in Figure 1. 
Table 2 shows results from one and two tailed Mann Whitney tests on asking prices 
(WTA) by treatment.  Where there was no prior belief as to which treatment would 
produce the higher or lower WTAs, two tailed tests were used. 
Asking Prices (WTA) for lottery scratch cards – Mann Whitney test 
results 
 
Treatment Description pvalue Mean 
Ranks 
T1 against T2 Noreg/No IOC against 
Noreg/IOC 
.023* T1 42.05 
T2 54.95 
T1 against T3 Noreg/No IOC against Reg/No 
IOC 
.000*** T1 36.59 
T3 60.41 
T1 against T4 
 
T2 against T3† 
 
T2 against T4† 
 
Noreg/No IOC against 
Reg/IOC 
 
Noreg/IOC against 
Reg/NoIOC 
 
Noreg/IOC against Reg/IOC 
.000*** 
 
.009** 
 
.047* 
 
T1 38.01 
T4 58.99 
T2 41.07 
T3 55.93 
T2 42.88 
T4 54.13 
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T3 against T4† 
 
 
Reg/NoIOC against Reg/IOC 
.578  
T3 50.07 
T4 46.93 
T1 and T2 against T3 
and T4 
No regret against regret .000*** T12 78.78 
T34 
114.22 
T1 and T3 against T2 
and T4 
No IOC against IOC .321 T13 92.53 
T24 
100.47 
 
Table 2: Mann Whitney tests on WTA 
*    significant at p ≤ 0.05, **   significant at p ≤ 0.01, significant at *** p ≤ 0.001 
† Denotes two tailed test 
 
There was a significant difference between stated valuations in T1 and T2, but no 
significant difference between T3 and T4.  Stated valuations in treatment 4 (Regret 
and IOC) are also significantly higher than those in the baseline treatment.  
However, a test of non-IOC against IOC treatments (i.e. 1 and 3 against 2 and 4) 
produced a p value of .321 so one has to conclude that although there is evidence of 
an IOC effect, it is not statistically significant in the experiment overall.  The 
alternative hypothesis is only accepted on a pure test of treatment 2 against treatment 
1. 
Hypothesis 2 - Feedback Conditional Regret 
There is more consistent evidence of a feedback conditional regret effect.  In 
Table 1, comparing the baseline (treatment 1) with the FCR only treatment 
(treatment 3) produces mean valuations of 1.54 in the baseline and 2.49 in treatment 
3; medians are 1.4 and 2.45 respectively. 
The cumulative frequency graph also displays quite a marked difference 
between treatments 1 and 3.  Treatments 2 and 4 (FCR only versus FCR and IOC) 
produced means of 1.86 and 2.34 and medians of 1.9 and 2.45. 
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The null hypothesis here is that there is no significant difference between 
WTA values in treatment 3 and treatment 1, indicating that the potential to regret 
selling one’s card is not affecting the amount required to part with it.  The alternative 
hypothesis is that the potential to regret is factored into decisions about how much 
compensation is required to part with it, producing higher WTA values in treatment 
3 than treatment 1.  Secondly if a FCR effect is present, there should be significant 
differences between treatments 1 and 2, where there should be no FCR, and 
treatments 3 and 4 which both contain the requirement to hand over sold cards to 
fellow participants for scratching. 
Mann Whitney tests in Table 2 confirm a robust FCR effect with highly 
significant differences between treatment 1 and treatment 3 and significant 
difference in valuations between treatments 2 and 4.  A test of non FCR against FCR 
treatments (treatments 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4) also produced a highly significant 
result.  This indicates that there is a strong FCR effect that exists independently of 
any IOC effect. 
There is strong evidence therefore that the prospect of another participant buying a 
seller’s card and revealing if it was a winning one made the sellers’ stated valuations 
markedly higher in regret treatments.  The alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Hypthothesis 3 – Interaction Effects 
The data don’t appear to support an interaction effect as stated valuations in 
treatment 4 are not higher than in both treatment 2 and treatment 3.  Although there 
was a significant difference between treatment 4 and treatment 2, given that a regret 
affect appears to be present, this could be cause by the effect of FCR alone. The null 
hypothesis must be accepted, there is no evidence that IOC and FCR compound each 
other. 
8. Discussion 
 
The clearest result from the analysis of the experimental data is that there is a 
highly significant FCR effect.  The results from Mann Whitney tests show 
significant differences between treatment 1 (the baseline) and treatment 3 (regret 
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only) and also a highly significant difference between the regret and no regret 
treatments.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that subjects will be 
more reluctant to part with a card if there is greater opportunity to experience regret. 
Despite some apparent support for the existence of IOC in treatment 2 (i.e. in 
comparison between this treatment and treatment 1) the results do not rule out the 
possibility that some other phenomenon would better explain the greater reluctance 
to part with a card selected from a coloured envelope, especially as the result 
disappeared when the IOC treatments were pooled.  Perhaps rather than a reflection 
of a belief that it has a greater chance of winning, the reluctance to sell is a reflection 
of the belief that subjects considered it to be more ‘theirs’ having gone through some 
kind of cognitive process to select it; a simple endowment effect.  Perhaps this effect 
was then somehow eclipsed once regret was introduced into the decision. 
Self-perception theory or the avoidance of cognitive dissonance may be 
applicable to the process of choosing a coloured envelope; subjects were required to 
make a second decision relating to the first in deciding whether to hold on to the card 
they had selected.  It is possible therefore that the act of choosing induced, not IOC, 
but a need to then justify one’s choice of envelope by playing out the scratch card 
option.  That is, it is as if in choosing the card subjects had set out on a path that it 
was easier to continue on than get off (something like a sunk cost effect) or as if they 
say to themselves I have chosen this envelope and this choice reflects on me, if I 
undo my choice I am saying I was wrong.  This phenomenon has been shown to 
persist even when decisions are imposed upon subjects and that choices viewed 
retrospectively may be somewhat personalised even if they were imposed or came 
about by a random rather than a deliberate process (e.g. Festinger and Carlsmith 
1959).  In this setting self-perception is hard to separate from cognitive dissonance.   
This could explain the higher asking prices in treatment 2, and perhaps the emotion 
of regret is simply stronger and overrules any fear of altering one’s fate by selling a 
scratch card chosen so deliberately. 
Considering that the objective probability of winning a prize is known it must 
be questioned whether there is really an irrational belief in a greater probability of 
winning.  It might be interesting to ask subjects in each treatment to rate their 
confidence that they will win a prize.  However, this highly subjective measure was 
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shown to be supportive of IOC in Langer and not supportive of IOC in Bar-Hilell 
and Neter so any results from such a question would have to be treated with great 
caution. 
In treatment 4, I would perhaps have expected that the envelope choice 
would have amplified the regret affect via the feelings of responsibility for the 
selection of the card; an FCR effect in addition to the IOC effect demonstrated in 
treatment 2; but this was not the case.    It may be the case that combining the 
potential for regret with IOC somehow causes IOC to lose its potency.  Perhaps 
subjects cannot focus on the two together and so the larger effect masks the lesser 
one.  There is evidence that there exists a counterfactual thought process that 
generates as much ‘imaginary’ regret as real (e.g. Roese 1997) as was found in the 
Bar-Hilell and Neter experiments where even outcomes that were unknowable had 
anticipated regret attached to them.    This would imply that sellers in the IOC 
treatment (2) might in fact not be demonstrating IOC, but rather suffering from 
imaginary potential regret.  It would be hard to identify this effect from the results 
here as this imagined regret could be mistaken for illusion of control, but perhaps the 
imagined regret disappears in treatment 4 ( as it is replaced by anticipation of the real 
thing) and that is why the IOC result does not hold. 
The debate as to what IOC consists of is not much advanced by the results 
reported here.  This was not however the intention of the research and whether it is 
labelled as magical thinking or IOC is not perhaps of the greatest importance, but 
they may tell us something about the mechanism by which it operates as the effect 
was present in the treatment where regret was absent.   
It is clear that there is some kind of feedback conditional regret effect present 
in the experiment.  The experiment reported here followed on from that of 
Humphrey et al. though the design here aimed to make the anticipated regret even 
more salient. Humphrey had made it clear that is participants sold back tickets in 
regret treatments they would have to watch the card being scratched after the sale but 
the idea of crossing the room and handing over the card was to allow participants to 
imagine how they might feel if they sold their card and somebody else won a prize 
from it.  Knowing that you will also be forced to witness the rejoicing of the person 
who benefited from your poor decision if the card turns out to be a winning one, 
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must make the anticipated regret stronger than if the card is merely returned to the 
experimenter to be scratched as it was in the previous experiments. This may be 
particularly strong motivation for asking for a higher price given the evidence from 
neuroimaging studies such as Coricelli’s, supporting the theory that people imagine 
the regret they could feel when making decisions. 
If  FCR exists in real world settings outside the laboratory such as in 
financial markets, housing markets and in consumer behaviour then its importance is 
apparent.  There is surely an implication for the accuracy of valuations of assets if 
the possibility of experiencing regret through feedback from decisions to sell 
increases the value we put on them.  The exploitation of feedback-conditional regret 
is in evidence outside the laboratory such as in the Dutch postcode lottery
9
(described 
in Zeelenberg 1999), the UK National lottery dream number game
10
 and the popular 
television game show ‘Deal or no Deal’11 which are all preying on people’s fear of 
regretting their decisions.  It seems therefore that the emotional content of decisions 
can be accounted for and should not be ignored by economists simply because it is 
harder to quantify than other ‘rational’ elements of decision making. 
 
                                                             
9
 This is a lottery run in Holland where postcodes are all entered in a draw for a large cash prize.  
Unless you pay and opt in to the draw you are not eligible to win but if your postcode is drawn you 
would find it impossible to hide from the information (the press or a ‘helpful’ neighbour would surely 
reveal your misfortune to you if you had not bought a ticket). 
10
 The game is played on the same ticket as the regular lottery.  The numbers on your ticket are 
eligible for entry into a second game only if you pay extra and opt in to that game. It has been 
designed so that there is no avoiding feedback because in order to win you need to match the numbers 
already chosen in the first game with those drawn in the ordinary lottery draw in the same order that 
they appear on your ticket.  Whilst checking to see if you have won in the ordinary draw you cannot 
help but learn if you would have won in the dream number game had you opted in to it. 
11 A group of twenty-two contestants play sequentially with one of the group chosen to play each 
week.  
There are 22 sealed boxes (one for each of the group of contestants) with 22 amounts of money 
printed on the lid inside.  Amounts range from £1 to £250,000. 
The current week’s contestant chooses a numbered box which they place in front of them for the 
duration of the game.  One by one, the player eliminates amounts that his box may contain by asking 
for the other 21 boxes to be opened to reveal the amount of money they contain.  Intermittently (say, 
every three boxes or so) the host of the show receives a telephone call from ‘the banker’ who offers to 
buy the players box for various sums depending on what amounts have already been eliminated from 
being within it (one imagines this is something like the expected value).  For example if lots of high 
amounts of money boxes have been opened the offers will be lower than if many low amount boxes 
have been opened.  The player clearly wishes to choose boxes containing low amounts of money 
therefore raising the probability that his own box contains one of the large amounts and so increasing 
the bankers offer.  Eventually the contestant either ‘deals’ and sells his box or refuses to deal and 
opens his box to reveal the amount of money he will take home 
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Appendix 
 
Experimental instructions  
 
Instructions are given below for treatments 1 and 4.  Treatments 2 and 3 were 
variations of these including or excluding the relevant elements for regret or illusion 
of control. 
 
Treatment 1 Seller Instructions– No Regret and No Illusion of Control 
 
Date.......................... 
Participant.................. 
Session........... 
ST1 NR/ NIOC 
. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment.  Please be assured that there are no tricks and no right 
or wrong decisions in this experiment, we are simply interested in how people 
behave. 
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You have been given a National Lottery scratchcard, which you will be asked to 
offer for sale in a moment.  If you do not sell the card during the experiment, it is 
yours to keep. 
Seven of your fellow participants have also been given a card; you are the 
‘cardholders’.  An auction will be held shortly, during which you will have an 
opportunity to sell your card for one of the amounts listed in the table overleaf 
.   
Four of the participants in the experiment are ‘cash-holders’ and will hold a separate 
auction in which they will bid for a different scratchcard than the one sold in your 
auction. 
 
Only one card will be sold during the cardholder auction.  The person who is willing 
to accept the lowest price for their card will be the person who sells it, but they will 
receive the second lowest asking price.  This means that whoever sells the card will 
always receive at least their minimum asking price. 
 
 
At the end of the auction the sold card will be returned to the pot of cards without 
being scratched.  Nobody will know if it was a winning card 
 
 
Please now complete the table by ticking all of the amounts that you would be 
willing to sell your card for. 
 
Because one card must be sold, the £5 box in the table is already filled in.   
 
 
 
I would accept the following amounts for the scratch card  
(please mark all that apply with a ) 
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£5.00  £3.30  £1.60  
£4.90  £3.20  £1.50  
£4.80  £3.10  £1.40  
£4.70  £3.00  £1.30  
£4.60  £2.90  £1.20  
£4.50  £2.80  £1.10  
£4.40  £2.70  £1.00  
£4.30  £2.60  £0.90p  
£4.20  £2.50  £0.80p  
£4.10  £2.40  £0.70p  
£4.00  £2.30  £0.60p  
£3.90  £2.20  £0.50p  
£3.80  £2.10  £0.40p  
£3.70  £2.00  £0.30p  
£3.60  £1.90  £0.20p  
£3.50  £1.80  £0.10p  
£3.40  £1.70    
 
N.B. In the event of a tie i.e. two or more participants choosing the same minimum 
selling price, the seller will be chosen at random and receive the second lowest 
asking price.  
Treatment 1 Buyer Instructions– No Regret and No Illusion of Control 
Date.......................... 
Participant.................. 
Session........... 
BT1 NR/ NIOC 
. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Welcome to the experiment.  Please be assured that there are no tricks and no right 
or wrong decisions in this experiment, we are simply interested in how people 
behave. 
 
You have been given £3.00, which you will be asked to use to bid in an auction for a 
national lottery scratchcard in a moment.  If you do not win the auction, the £3.00 is 
yours to keep.  If you win the auction, you will receive the scratchcard in exchange 
for some or all of the £3.00 (depending on the auction price) and can keep any left 
over cash. 
 
Three of your fellow participants have also been given £3.00 in cash; you are the 
‘cash-holders’. An auction will be held shortly, during which you will have an 
opportunity to buy a scratchcard for one of the amounts listed in the table overleaf. 
 
Eight of your fellow participants have been given a scratchcard; they are the 
‘cardholders’ and will hold a completely separate auction in which they will offer to 
sell their cards.  This is not connected to your auction. 
 
Only one card will be bought during the cash-holder auction.  The person who is 
willing to pay the highest price for a scratchcard will be the person who buys it, but 
they will pay the second highest offer price.  This means that whoever buys the card 
will never pay more than their maximum offer price. 
At the end of the auction the bought card will be given to the highest bidder. 
 
Please now complete the table by ticking all of the amounts that you would be 
willing to pay for a scratchcard. 
 
Because one card must be bought, the 10p box in the table is already filled in.   
I would be willing to pay the following amounts for the scratchcard  
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(please mark all that apply with a ) 
£3.00  £1.90  £0.80p  
£2.90  £1.80  £0.70p  
£2.80  £1.70  £0.60p  
£2.70  £1.60  £0.50  
£2.60  £1.50  £0.40  
£2.50  £1.40  £0.30  
£2.40  £1.30  £0.20  
£2.30  £1.20  £0.10  
£2.20  £1.10  
£2.10  £1.00  
£2.00  £0.90p  
 
 
In the event of a tie i.e. two or more participants choosing the same maximum offer 
price, the buyer will be chosen at random and will pay the second lowest offer price.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatment 4 Seller Instructions – Regret and Illusion of Control 
 
Date.......................... 
Participant.................. 
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Session........... 
ST4 R/IOC  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Welcome to the experiment.  Please be assured that there are no tricks and no right 
or wrong decisions in this experiment, we are simply interested in how people 
behave. 
 
 
 
You have selected a National Lottery scratchcard, which you will be asked to offer 
for sale in a moment.  If you do not sell the card during the experiment, it is yours to 
keep. 
Seven of your fellow participants have also chosen a card; you are the ‘cardholders’.  
An auction will be held shortly, during which you will have an opportunity to sell 
your card for one of the amounts listed in the table overleaf 
.   
Four of the participants in the experiment are ‘cash-holders’ and will hold a separate 
auction in which they will bid for the scratchcard that is sold in your auction. 
 
 
Only one card will be sold during the cardholder auction.  The person who is willing 
to accept the lowest price for their card will be the person who sells it, but they will 
receive the second lowest asking price.  This means that whoever sells the card will 
always receive at least their minimum asking price. 
 
 
At the end of the auction the cardholder who sells their card will be asked to cross 
the room and hand over the sold card to the winner of the cash-holder auction.  They 
will then be asked, along with all other participants, to witness the card being 
scratched.  The buyer of the card will receive any prize money from the card.  
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Please now complete the table by ticking all of the amounts that you would be 
willing to sell your card for. 
 
Because one card must be sold, the £5 box in the table is already filled in.   
 
I would accept the following amounts for the scratch card  
(please mark all that apply with a ) 
£5.00  £3.30  £1.60  
£4.90  £3.20  £1.50  
£4.80  £3.10  £1.40  
£4.70  £3.00  £1.30  
£4.60  £2.90  £1.20  
£4.50  £2.80  £1.10  
£4.40  £2.70  £1.00  
£4.30  £2.60  £0.90p  
£4.20  £2.50  £0.80p  
£4.10  £2.40  £0.70p  
£4.00  £2.30  £0.60p  
£3.90  £2.20  £0.50p  
£3.80  £2.10  £0.40p  
£3.70  £2.00  £0.30p  
£3.60  £1.90  £0.20p  
£3.50  £1.80  £0.10p  
£3.40  £1.70    
 
N.B. In the event of a tie i.e. two or more participants choosing the same minimum 
selling price, the seller will be chosen at random and receive the second lowest 
asking price.  
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Date.......................... 
Participant.................. 
Session........... 
BT4 R/ IOC 
. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Welcome to the experiment.  Please be assured that there are no tricks and no right 
or wrong decisions in this experiment, we are simply interested in how people 
behave. 
 
You have been given £3.00, which you will be asked to use to bid in an auction for a 
national lottery scratchcard in a moment.  If you do not win the auction, the £3.00 is 
yours to keep.  If you win the auction, you will receive the scratchcard in exchange 
for some or all of the £3.00 (depending on the auction price) and can keep any left 
over cash. 
 
Three of your fellow participants have also been given £3.00 in cash; you are the 
‘cash-holders’. An auction will be held shortly, during which you will have an 
opportunity to buy a scratchcard for one of the amounts listed in the table overleaf. 
 
 
Eight of your fellow participants have been given a scratchcard; they are the 
‘cardholders’ and will hold an auction in which they will offer to sell their cards.   
 
Only one card will be bought during the cash-holder auction.  The person who is 
willing to pay the highest price for a scratchcard will be the person who buys it, but 
they will pay the second highest offer price.  This means that whoever buys the card 
will never pay more than their maximum offer price. 
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Although the auctions are conducted separately, the card that is sold in the 
cardholder auction will be the same one that is bought in the cash-holder auction. 
 
At the end of the auctions the card that has been bought will be given to the highest 
bidder from your auction by the cardholder who has sold it in the other auction.  The 
cash-holder who has bought it will be asked to scratch the card in front of the seller 
and all other participants. 
 
 
 
Please now complete the table by ticking all of the amounts that you would be 
willing to pay for a scratchcard. 
 
Because one card must be bought, the 10p box in the table is already filled in.   
 
I would be willing to pay the following amounts for the scratchcard  
(please mark all that apply with a ) 
£3.00  £1.90  £0.80p  
£2.90  £1.80  £0.70p  
£2.80  £1.70  £0.60p  
£2.70  £1.60  £0.50  
£2.60  £1.50  £0.40  
£2.50  £1.40  £0.30  
£2.40  £1.30  £0.20  
£2.30  £1.20  £0.10  
£2.20  £1.10  
£2.10  £1.00  
£2.00  £0.90p  
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N.B. In the event of a tie i.e. two or more participants choosing the same maximum 
offer price, the buyer will be chosen at random and will pay the second lowest offer 
price.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
